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ZARIN V. COMMISSIONER REVISITED
AND SOME METHODOLOGIES FOR
DETERMINING COD INCOME
PHILIP G. COHEN*
ABSTRACT
The focus of this Article is a revisit of a very well-known and
much written about Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Zarin
v. Commissioner, concerning whether the taxpayer had COD income.
Zarin dealt with whether a compulsive and unlucky gambler could
avoid COD income when he settled with the casino for substantially less than what he owed. Along with a plethora of diverse
third-party assessments of the case, the judges who heard the case
and its appeal were also divided. The Tax Court opinion was
decided by an eleven to eight vote for the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), with three separate dissenting opinions, and was followed
by a Third Circuit reversal, with a two to one split of the judges. In
a much-criticized decision, the divided Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a split Tax Court and held that the hapless gambler did not have discharge of indebtedness income. While many
esteemed scholars have made plausible arguments to the contrary,
this Article concludes that Zarin should have been determined to
have COD income from his settlement with the casino. Zarin was
not subject to tax when he received the gambling chips because
both parties had an understanding it would be repaid. This tax
benefit he received at the time of the loan resulted in COD income
upon the indebtedness’ settlement for less than what was owed,
unless an exception applied, and none should have in this case.
Professor of Taxation, Pace University Lubin School of Business; Retired
Vice President–Tax & General Tax Counsel, Unilever United States, Inc.; BA
New York University; JD Duke University School of Law; LL.M. (Labor Law
& Taxation) New York University School of Law; MBA (Accounting) George
Washington University. The author thanks Michael Schler and Professor Richard
Kraus for their helpful comments on an earlier draft and his graduate teaching
assistant, David Toto, for his assistance with this Article. All errors, omissions,
and views, however, are only those of the author.
*
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This Article will also examine some of the theories for determining if a taxpayer has COD income and how they relate to
Zarin. The loan proceeds methodology, or a variation thereof, is
the proper means of establishing whether a taxpayer has COD income, prior to considering whether any of the exceptions apply.
The freeing of assets and the Kerbaugh-Empire form of the whole
transaction approaches should no longer be followed by the courts.
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INTRODUCTION
Among the litany of items specifically listed as included in
gross income in section 61 is “[i]ncome from the discharge of indebtedness.”1 This is commonly referred to by the acronym COD,
short for cancellation of debt income. Section 1082 further addresses income from the discharge of indebtedness, including
providing for several exclusions.3 Most of the exclusions require,
as a quid pro quo, a reduction of favorable tax attributes.4 Thus,
often when section 108 applies, the taxpayer achieves a deferral
rather than a permanent tax benefit.5 As observed by one scholar,
“[t]he determination of whether a taxpayer must include a discharge of indebtedness in gross income requires ... a two-part
analysis. It must first be determined whether gross income conceptually exists pursuant to an analysis under section 61.”6 Assuming that this “results in a determination that gross income does
in fact exist, it must then be determined whether any portion of
such amount may be excluded from gross income under section
108 ... [or a non-statutory exclusion].”7 The focus of this Article
is a revisit of a very well-known and much written about Third
Circuit Court of Appeals decision,8 Zarin v. Commissioner,9 concerning whether the taxpayer had COD income.
I.R.C. § 61(a)(12).
I.R.C. § 108.
3 An examination of the statutory exclusions under section 108 is beyond
the scope of this Article. There is an abundance of fine scholarship in this area.
See, e.g., Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Daniel L. Simmons, A Field Guide to Cancellation of Debt Income, 63 TAX LAW. 415, 449–69 (2010); Fred T. Witt, Jr. &
William H. Lyons, An Examination of the Tax Consequences of Discharge of
Indebtedness, 10 VA. TAX REV. 1, 43–111 (1990). There are non-statutory exclusions
as well. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Cancellation of Debt
and Related Transactions, 69 TAX LAW. 161, 166–69 (2015).
4 McMahon & Simmons, supra note 3, at 449.
5 Id.
6 James L. Musselman, Is Income from Discharge of Indebtedness Really
Income at All? A Proposal for a More Reasoned Analysis, 34 U. MEM. L. REV.
607, 608–09 (2004).
7 Id. at 609.
8 Professor Lawrence Zelenak observed that “[n]o non–Supreme Court federal
income tax case in recent decades has generated more commentary from tax academics and practitioners than Zarin.” Lawrence Zelenak, Cancellation-of-Indebtedness Income and Transactional Accounting, 29 VA. TAX REV. 277, 321 (2009).
9 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990), rev’g 92 T.C. 1084 (1989).
1
2
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The Article will also examine some of the theories for determining if a taxpayer has COD income and how they relate to
Zarin.10 One commentator described Zarin as “a perplexing and
difficult case, both theoretically and under existing tax law.”11
Another scholar referred to it as “a wonderfully wacky case.”12
Zarin dealt with whether a compulsive and unlucky gambler
could avoid COD income when he settled with the casino for
substantially less than what he owed.13 Along with a plethora of
diverse third-party assessments of the case, the judges who heard
the case and its appeal were also divided.14 The Tax Court opinion
was decided by an eleven to eight vote for the IRS, with three
separate dissenting opinions,15 and was followed by a Third Circuit reversal, with a two to one split of the judges.16 This writer
has the fortunate vantage point of thirty plus years of hindsight.
In a much-criticized decision, the divided Third Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed a split Tax Court and held that the hapless
gambler, who in the year in question was in the seventy percent
tax bracket,17 did not have a discharge of indebtedness income.18
There are some credible arguments made by very esteemed scholars
that the holding, but generally not the reasoning, of the Third
Circuit, that Zarin should not have had taxable income, was
proper.19 While admittedly not entirely free from doubt, these
See infra Part I.
Daniel Shaviro, The Man Who Lost Too Much: Zarin v. Commissioner
and the Measurement of Taxable Consumption, 45 TAX L. REV. 215, 221 (1990).
He may have been referring to the Tax Court decision since that was the focus of
most of the article; although, he added an addendum to address the Third Circuit decision, which was released shortly before the article went to press. See
id. at 252–58.
12 Deborah H. Schenk, The Story of Kirby Lumber: The Many Faces of Discharge of Indebtedness Income, in TAX STORIES 137, 164 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2d
ed. 2009).
13 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1084; Zarin, 916 F.2d at 111–12.
14 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1084–116; Zarin, 916 F.2d at 110–18.
15 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1084–116.
16 Zarin, 916 F.2d at 110–18.
17 Id. at 112.
18 Id. at 110.
19 Joseph M. Dodge, Zarin v. Commissioner: Musings About Debt Cancellations and ‘Consumption’ in an Income Tax Base, 45 TAX L. REV. 677, 683 n.33
(1990); Calvin H. Johnson, Zarin and the Tax Benefit Rule: Tax Models for
10
11
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writers conclude that the right position is that he should have
been taxed.20
Before David Zarin sustained gambling losses at the Resorts International Hotel in Atlantic City, New Jersey, and even
prior to the codification of the treatment of income from the discharge of indebtedness, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Kirby Lumber Co. determined that a debtor had taxable income
upon the reduction of a debt for an amount less than what it owed.21
An understanding of why the Third Circuit’s decision in Zarin was
amiss requires some background into the conceptual frameworks for
the determination of COD income. This begins with Kirby Lumber.
I.BACKGROUND—CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE
DETERMINATION OF COD INCOME AND THE
LEGACY OF KIRBY LUMBER
In a two-paragraph opinion,22 the Supreme Court held that
where the taxpayer, “the Kirby Lumber Company, issued its own
bonds for $12,126,80023 for which it received their par value24 ...
[and] [l]ater in the same year it purchased in the open market
some of the same bonds at less than par, the difference” was
taxable income.25 The Court, focusing on the taxpayer’s increase
in net worth, reasoned that “there was no shrinkage of assets
and the taxpayer made a clear gain. As a result of its dealings it
made available $137,521.30 assets previously offset by the obligation of bonds now extinct.”26 As to why Kirby Lumber was
able to buy its bonds back at a reduced price, Professors Marvin
Gambling Losses and the Forgiveness of Gambling Debts, 45 TAX L. REV. 697,
697–99 (1990); Shaviro, supra note 11, at 258.
20 Dodge, supra note 19, at 683 n.33; Johnson, supra note 19, at 697–99;
Shaviro, supra note 11, at 258.
21 284 U.S. 1, 1 (1931).
22 Professor Deborah H. Schenk characterized the decision as “one of the
shortest Supreme Court opinions ever to pack such a wallop.” Schenk, supra
note 12, at 137.
23 While not mentioned in the opinion, Professor Schenk indicated that
Kirby Lumber did not in fact receive cash for the bonds, but instead, “they
were issued for preferred stock and accrued dividend arrearages.” Id. at 138.
24 $1,078,300.
25 Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. at 2–3.
26 Id. at 3.
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A. Chirelstein and Lawrence Zelenak noted that while “the facts in
Kirby are not fully developed, it seems reasonable to assume that
the company was able to repurchase its bonds at a discount because of a general rise in the market rate of interest.”27
While there is a wide consensus that the Court’s decision
in Kirby Lumber was correct, the perceived rationale “that additional assets ... became ‘available’ to the taxpayer”28 has been
subject to much criticism. Professors Boris Bittker and Lawrence
Lokken opined in their seminal treatise, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts, that the Kirby Lumber “result is entirely
justifiable, but the opinion’s cryptic explanation set afloat several
erroneous ideas leading to a confusing patchwork of rules and
exceptions that dominates the area to this day.”29 They added
that the Kirby Lumber reference to “no shrinkage of assets”30 has
created “[a] particularly troublesome legacy,”31 which is the “tendency of some courts to read Kirby Lumber as holding that taxable gain resulted from the freeing of assets on the cancellation of
indebtedness, rather than the cancellation itself.”32 They indicated that “[i]n actuality, income results from the discharge of
indebtedness because the taxpayer received more than is paid back,
not because assets are freed of offsetting liabilities on the balance
sheet.”33 In a similar vein, Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak
asked “[c]ould the taxpayer have avoided inclusion by showing
that its net worth had been reduced by losses or by a decline in
the value of other property?”34 The answer should be no.
While there is little doubt that “for a discharge of indebtedness to generate gross income, the discharge must result in an
accession to wealth for the taxpayer,”35 there is some disagreement
MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A
LAW STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 59 (14th ed. 2018).
28 Id.
29 BORIS T. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 7.1 (2d/3d ed. 1993–2019, updated July 2020).
30 Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. at 3.
31 See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 29, ¶ 7.1.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 27, at 59.
35 Witt & Lyons, supra note 3, at 5. The term “accession to wealth” is from
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
27
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by the courts and scholars as to the proper conceptual framework
for making this determination.36 Professor James L. Musselman
commented that “cases dealing with the issue of income from
discharge of indebtedness have resulted in a variety of theories
and results, none of which have been uniformly accepted by courts
or commentators.”37 He faults “improper analysis”38 by the Supreme
Court in Kirby Lumber and Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co.,39
discussed infra, and the fact that “courts subsequently dealing
with the issue of income from discharge of indebtedness in different
factual settings have had to give deference to those precedents
in trying to reach a rational decision.”40 In trying to reach an
“equitable result,”41 relating to COD income, Professor Musselman
asserted that the “courts seized upon any precedent or idea they
could find to rationalize their equitable result. Understandably,
this has resulted in the confusing patchwork of theories and
rationales for [many] decisions ....”42
Before discussing methodologies for determining COD income that are arguably explicitly derived from the language in
Kirby Lumber, it should be noted that the loan replacement approach is a much more conceptually sound theory even though
its connection to Kirby Lumber may be less clear. A conceptual
framework that originated from the words used in Kirby Lumber,
the freeing of assets theory (also known as net worth or balance
sheet theories)43 has been utilized by “[n]umerous courts”44 but also
has been the subject of “withering criticism.”45 The methodology
was articulated by Professor Deborah H. Schenk as follows:
[A] debtor recognizes income when a debt is discharged because
the discharge decreases the debtor’s liabilities but does not decrease the debtor’s assets. The income arises from the increase in
See Musselman, supra note 6, at 610–30.
Id. at 631.
38 Id.
39 271 U.S. 170, 170–75 (1926).
40 Musselman, supra note 6, at 631–32.
41 Id. at 632.
42 Id.
43 See, e.g., CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 27, at 60–61.
44 Schenk, supra note 12, at 144.
45 Id.
36
37
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net worth. A determination of whether the taxpayer has income
requires an examination of the taxpayer’s balance sheet at
the time the debt is discharged.46

Professor Lawrence Zelenak commented that
[u]nder [this] approach, the manner in which the debt was incurred in the prior year, and in particular the consideration
(if any) that the taxpayer received in exchange for incurring
the debt, is irrelevant to the determination of the tax consequences of the cancellation of the debt in the current year.47

He explained that “[t]his analysis looks only to the events of the
year of the cancellation of the debt; the manner in which the
debt was created in some earlier year does not matter.”48
In their breakthrough article on COD income, Professors
Boris I. Bittker and Barton H. Thompson described both the origin
of and the error in the use of the freeing of assets theory:
A second source of confusion in Kirby Lumber was the Court’s
assertion that the transaction “made available $137,521.30 assets
previously offset by the [obligation to repay].” ... A particularly
troublesome legacy of the above passage has been the tendency
of some courts to read Kirby Lumber as holding that it is the
freeing of assets on the cancellation of indebtedness, rather than
the cancellation itself, that creates a taxable gain. Such reasoning misses the point. Income results from the discharge of
indebtedness because the taxpayer received (and excluded
from income) funds that he is no longer required to pay back,
not because assets are freed of offsetting liabilities on the balance sheet. Debtors who ultimately pay back less than they
received enjoy a financial benefit whether the funds are invested successfully, lost in a business venture, spent for food
and clothing, or given to a charity.49

Id.
Zelenak, supra note 8, at 281.
48 Id.
49 Boris I. Bittker & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Income From the Discharge
of Indebtedness: The Progeny of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 66 CALIF.
L. REV. 1159, 1165 (1978) (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Kirby
Lumber, 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931)). Professor Thompson became a professor after
the article was published. Biography: Barton H. “Buzz” Thompson, Jr., STAN.
L. SCH., https://law.stanford.edu/directory/barton-thompson/ [https://perma.cc
/A84X-PJN5].
46
47
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Professor Schenk pointed out that “if Kirby Lumber was
able to repurchase its bonds at a discount, they were not worth
face value immediately before the repurchase.”50 Professors Bittker
and Lokken added that “[i]f the company’s assets and liabilities
to creditors had been valued at their fair market values, the
company’s net worth would have been the same before and after
the repurchase.”51 Professor Schenk criticized this methodology,
by observing that
the solvency or net worth of a taxpayer is not a determinant
of the taxability of amounts received in other situations. For
example, it is clear that the receipt of salary by an insolvent
taxpayer is clearly taxable income even though the debtor
remains insolvent after using the cash to reduce the debt.52

A Supreme Court case decided a few years prior to Kirby
Lumber, Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co.,53 had its own troubling legacy which included its brief examination by the Court in
Kirby Lumber.54 In Kerbaugh-Empire, the taxpayer owned stock
in a company engaged in the construction business that had
borrowed money pre–World War I, from the Deutsche Bank of
Germany.55 The loans were payable in German marks or their
equivalent in U.S. gold coin.56 The funds were utilized in the
unsuccessful construction business and repaid to the Alien
Property Custodian in substantially devalued marks after the
war.57 The “difference between the value of the marks borrowed
at the time the loans were made and the amount paid to the
Custodian was $684,456.18.”58 The Commissioner argued this
was taxable income, but the taxpayer prevailed on the theory
that “the loss was less than it would have been if [the] marks
had not declined in value; but the mere diminution of loss is not
gain, profit or income.”59 Professor Schenk commented that “there
Schenk, supra note 12, at 144.
BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 29, ¶ 7.1.
52 Schenk, supra note 12, at 145.
53 Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 170–75 (1926).
54 Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. at 1–2.
55 Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. at 171–72.
56 Id. at 172.
57 Id. at 172–73.
58 Id. at 173.
59 Id. at 175.
50
51
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was an increase in net worth in Kerbaugh-Empire,” as there was
in Kirby Lumber.60 She reasoned that
[s]uppose a taxpayer has $100 of liabilities and $40 of assets.
A creditor discharges a $20 loan. ... Only someone who has no
understanding of negative numbers could fail to see that T’s
net worth has increased, or to put it another way, that there
has been a decrease in T’s negative net worth.61

Professor Schenk expressed a persuasive and widely shared
disagreement with the distinction the Court made in Kirby Lumber
from Kerbaugh-Empire62 in that, in the latter case, “the transaction as a whole was a loss ....”63 This distinction spawned another
approach by some courts and scholars for determining whether a
transaction gave rise to COD income. This methodology is referred
to as the “the whole transaction theory”64 (also known as “the
transaction as a whole”).65 Professor Schenk found this theory, at
least as it has been historically utilized, as “not only theoretically
wrong, [but] completely impractical.”66 One example she gave of
why the historic whole transaction approach should be a nonstarter was a scenario wherein a “taxpayer borrows $20,000, invests
it in his business, and loses the entire amount. Most likely, the loss
would be deductible, and if he also were permitted to exclude the
Schenk, supra note 12, at 145.
Id. But see Zelenak, supra note 8, at 287 (freeing of assets methodology
could be viewed as having some merit if the “focus[ is] on an increase in the
taxpayer’s net worth, or an improvement in the taxpayer’s balance sheet [irrespective of whether or not there is positive net worth]”). He wrote that the
freeing-of-assets was always an unfortunate way of expressing the idea that COD income is based on an increase in the
taxpayer’s net worth .... If the rationale for taxation of COD
income is that it increases the taxpayer’s net worth or improves the taxpayer’s balance sheet, nothing in that rationale
requires or even suggests that there should be no COD income simply because the taxpayer does not have a positive
net worth after the debt cancellation. In short, the insolvency
exception [to COD income] was based on an imperfect understanding of the net worth (NW) theory ....
Id.
62 See Schenk, supra note 12, at 145–47.
63 United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931).
64 See, e.g., Schenk, supra note 12, at 145.
65 Bittker & Thompson, supra note 49, at 1162.
66 Schenk, supra note 12, at 146.
60
61
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$20,000 when the lender discharges the debt, he effectively would
have a double deduction.”67 This method is also unworkable.68
Professor Schenk wrote that “[i]n order to apply it, one has to know
the use to which the borrowed funds were put. This is a completely implausible approach due to the fungibility of money.”69
Professors Bittker and Thompson provided the following
summary of the historic whole transaction theory’s source and
why it is defective:
Kirby Lumber carried forward from Kerbaugh-Empire the theory
that the taxability of a debt discharge depends on the profitability of “the transaction as a whole,” requiring consideration not
merely of whether the taxpayer borrowed more than it repaid
but also of whether the use of the borrowed funds was profitable. It is usually impossible to make this latter determination,
however, since the borrowed funds are ordinarily absorbed into
the business so completely that tracing the travels of interchangeable dollars lacks even the surface plausibility that it
could claim in Kerbaugh-Empire. Even where funds can be
traced to a particular project, the attribution is artificial since
in most cases borrowing frees up funds that the debtor can
then use to finance other projects. It is therefore misleading
to limit an examination of “the transaction as a whole” to the
fate of only those projects directly financed with the borrowed
funds. Tying the tax treatment of debt discharge to the fate of
the borrowed funds is also irrational for another reason. Since
the amount borrowed will ultimately be capitalized, expensed,
or nondeductible depending on how the borrowed funds are used,
the fate of the funds will already be reflected in the debtor’s net
income. If borrowed funds are invested and lost in an ill-fated
business venture, the full amount borrowed will generally be
deductible as a business loss. If the taxpayer later settles the
debt for less than its issue price, an exclusion of the difference
because the funds were lost would be tantamount to a double
deduction for a single loss.70

Professors Martin J. McMahon, Jr. and Daniel L. Simmons
indicated that Kerbaugh-Empire “is now treated as an anomaly.”71
Id.
Id.
69 Id.
70 See Bittker & Thompson, supra note 49, at 1162–63.
71 McMahon & Simmons, supra note 3, at 424. Professor Schenk, however,
noted that Kerbaugh-Empire has never been overruled. See Schenk, supra note
12, at 148.
67
68
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They pointed out that “the Service, the Tax Court, and the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have concluded that KerbaughEmpire Co. lacks precedential authority in light of subsequent
Supreme Court decisions.”72
In contrast, the loan proceeds theory is embraced by many
courts and scholars.73 This approach is also known as “mistakecorrection.”74 Credit is given by scholars to the article mentioned
above by Professors Bittker and Thompson75 for influencing courts
and fellow academics as to the merit of this approach.76
Professors McMahon and Simmons succinctly explained
the loan proceeds concept as,
if a debt is cancelled and the borrower is relieved of the duty to
repay the loan, the cancellation of the debt has tax consequences
because the benefit of receipt of cash at the time of the borrowing without realization of income is offset by elimination of repayment, producing an overall economic benefit to the borrower.77

Professors Douglas A. Kahn and Jeffrey H. Kahn elaborated on this methodology as follows: “When someone borrows
money, the borrower does not recognize income because it is
assumed that the borrower will repay the loan. In effect, the
debt prevents the borrower from recognizing income because of
the assumption that the loan will be repaid.”78 Furthermore,
“forgiveness of the debt removes the obstacle to tax the borrower
on the amount of the loan that would have been income when
McMahon & Simmons, supra note 3, at 424–25. The Ninth Circuit decision, Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner, 790 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1986) was cited
and heavily relied upon by the Tax Court in Zarin in rejecting taxpayer’s
contention that he had no COD income because “the settlement merely reduced the amount of his loss and did not result in income.” Zarin v. Comm’r,
92 T.C. 1084, 1092 (1989).
73 See, e.g., Schenk, supra note 12, at 147.
74 See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 8, at 282; Chad J. Pomeroy, Comment, Preslar
v. Commissioner: Debt-Discharge Income and Its Rationale, 2000 BYU L. REV.
1677, 1689 (2000) (referring to mistake-correction as “symmetry”) (citing United
States v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 310 (1983)).
75 See generally Bittker & Thompson, supra note 49 and accompanying text.
76 See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 8, at 284–85 (citing Theodore P. Seto, The
Function of the Discharge of Indebtedness Doctrine: Complete Accounting in
the Federal Income Tax System, 51 TAX L. REV. 199, 203 (1996)).
77 See McMahon & Simmons, supra note 3, at 419–20.
78 See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 166.
72
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borrowed if there had not then been an obligation to repay.”79 In
other words, the extinguishment of all part of the debt, results
in the debtor “enjoy[ing] an accretion [or more commonly referred to as an “accession”] to wealth.”80 Professors Kahn and
Kahn observed that “[i]t is not the debtor’s increase in net worth
that is taxable; rather, it is a tax on the amount that previously
was thought to have been borrowed and turned out to have just
been an enrichment of the ‘borrower.’”81
While this latter notion of when COD income should arise
is intellectually compelling, the Court has provided mixed signals that it has rejected the freeing of assets theory entirely for
the loan proceeds approach.82 Professor Schenk pointed to United
States v. Centennial Savings Bank83 as embracing both theories.84
She quoted the following passage:
Borrowed funds are excluded from income in the first instance
because the taxpayer’s obligation to repay the funds offsets any
increase in the taxpayer’s assets; if the taxpayer is thereafter
released from his obligation to repay, the taxpayer enjoys a net
increase in assets equal to the forgiven portion of the debt,
and the basis for the original exclusion thus evaporates.85

A few years earlier, however, in Commissioner v. Tufts, the
Court seemed to shift away from the freeing of assets approach.86
Id.
See Schenk, supra note 12, at 148.
81 See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 166.
82 See Schenk, supra note 12, at 151 (noting that “[l]egislative history indicates that when Congress revamped the insolvency rules as part of the Bankruptcy Act of 1980, it abandoned the freeing-of-assets theory in favor of the
loan proceeds approach”).
83 See generally United States v. Centennial Sav. Bank, 499 U.S. 573 (1991).
84 See Schenk, supra note 12, at 148.
85 Schenk, supra note 12, at 148 (citing Centennial Savings Bank, 499 U.S.
573). In Centennial Savings Bank, the Court held, in relevant part, that
penalties collected by the taxpayer from depositors making early withdrawals
was not “income by reason of the discharge ... of indebtedness,” and thus taxpayer
was not entitled to exclude such amounts under an exception provided in
section 108(a)(1). Centennial Savings Bank, 499 U.S. at 579–81.
86 Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 313 (1983). Gregory M. Giangiordano
noted that “[i]n Tufts, the Supreme Court essentially changed the test for
determining discharge of indebtedness income from the previous ‘freezing of
assets’ approach ... to a consideration of the tax symmetry of the overall loan
79
80
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The reference to both theories by the Court in Centennial
Savings for finding COD income is not an aberration. For example, in Commissioner v. Jacobson, a solvent taxpayer, albeit one
in “straitened financial circumstances,” was, because of his financial situation, able to buy back his own obligations at a discount.87 The Court noted that “[i]n each sale the bondholder
sought to minimize his probable loss by getting as much as possible, directly or indirectly, from the maker of the bonds as the
one available purchaser of them.”88 The Court found that this
resulted in the taxpayer having “realized an immediate financial
transaction.” Gregory M. Giangiordano, Discharge of Indebtedness Income—Zarin
v. Commissioner, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 1189, 1195 (1991) (citing Tufts, 461 U.S. at
313)). Another commentator, Chad J. Pomeroy, was in accord. He explained that:
The Supreme Court, though, in Commissioner v. Tufts, seemed
to move away from the freed assets justification. In Tufts, the
taxpayer owned property that was subject to a nonrecourse
mortgage (an obligation for which he was not personally liable). The taxpayer transferred the property to a buyer, and
the buyer assumed the nonrecourse debt. The Court held that
the taxpayer realized income equal to the amount of the discharged mortgage. The Court did not look at whether the discharge freed any of the taxpayer’s assets; instead, it focused
on the symmetry of the loan transaction. The Court reasoned
that the taxpayer did not have to pay taxes on the original
loan because the government assumed that he would eventually repay the debt using after-tax dollars. The Court further
reasoned that, if the government’s prediction proved incorrect
(the taxpayer ended up not repaying the obligation), the taxpayer would have “effectively ... received untaxed income at
the time the loan was extended” [citing Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310].
So, when it becomes clear that a taxpayer is not going to repay
the debt (in other words, when it becomes clear that the taxpayer received untaxed income), the IRS is allowed to remedy
this error by taxing the amount of unpaid debt as income. It
does not matter whether the taxpayer discharged a recourse
mortgage or a nonrecourse mortgage (an action that would
not free up assets because the taxpayer was never personally
liable for the debt); what matters is that the IRS’s treatment
of the back end of the transaction should be consistent with
its treatment of the front end of the transaction. Tufts changed
the rationale for debt-discharge income. No longer is a debt
discharge included in income only when it frees assets.
Pomeroy, supra note 74, at 1681–82 (citations omitted).
87 See generally Comm’r v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 30 (1949).
88 Id.

552 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:537
gain from his purchase of these bonds at a discount. By that acquisition he was enabled, at will, to cancel them and thus discharge
himself from liability to pay them.”89 Signaling adherence to the
freeing of assets concept, the Court indicated that this “improved
his net worth by the difference between their face amount and
the price he paid for them.”90 Two sentences later, the Court
used language more reminiscent of the loan proceeds methodology, when it stated “[i]n the first instance he had received the
full face amount in cash for these bonds so that his repurchase
of them for 50 percent, or less, of that amount reflected a substantial benefit ....”91
It is worth noting that Congress at one point was sympathetic to taxpayers in situations like those in Jacobson and Kirby
Lumber.92 While section 108(a)(1)(A) and (B) today provide an
exception to COD income for those taxpayers in a formal bankruptcy proceeding or who are insolvent, prior to the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, “relief under § 108 was made available not only to
debtors in distress (like the taxpayer in Jacobson), but also to
Kirby-type taxpayers who might be in perfectly healthy condition and simply benefitting from a general rise in market rates
of interest.”93
Id. at 38.
Id.
91 See Jacobson, 336 U.S. at 38–39; see also McMahon & Simmons, supra
note 3, at 420. While not germane to the issue of methodologies for the determination of COD income, it should be noted that in Jacobson, the Supreme
Court also rejected taxpayer’s argument that the gain was an excludable gift
and distinguished its earlier decision, Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S.
322 (1943). Jacobson, 336 U.S. at 28 (holding that a gift could arise in the
context of a commercial settlement). Professor Schenk noted that in Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960), “the Supreme Court [subsequently]
crafted a definition of a gift for income tax purposes that in most cases would
preclude a gift where debt is discharged in a commercial setting.” Schenk,
supra note 12, at 153.
92 CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 27, at 62.
93 Id. See generally I.R.C. § 108. Professor Schenk elaborated on the history
of then section 61(a)(12) and section 108:
Congress codified the Kirby Lumber rule in § 61(a)(12) [currently § 61(a)(11)] when it adopted the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. Previously, the provision with respect to COD income was
only in the regulations. The 1939 Code, however, added the
predecessor of §§ 108 and 1017. The original version of § 108
89
90
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While Professor Zelenak referred to the approach he advocated for determining COD income as “transactional accounting”
or “whole-transaction analysis,”94 this methodology represents a
clarification of the loan proceeds approach. He explicitly acknowledged that “[t]he [loan proceeds/mistake correction] LP/MC theory should be the only theory of debt cancellation income.”95 His
amplification of the loan proceeds methodology centered on “the
premise that a discharge of a no-benefit debt should be nontaxable under the [loan proceeds/mistake correction] LP/MC analysis ....”96 That is, the loan proceeds concept is based on the notion
that when the taxpayer incurred the indebtedness initially, he was
not taxed, i.e., the taxpayer received a tax benefit because of the
understanding that the loan would be repaid and therefore, at
that point, there was no accession to wealth.97 If there was no
tax benefit, COD income should not arise upon the debt settlement.98 Professor Richard C. E. Beck, who was quoted by Professor
Zelenak, explained that, “[t]o the extent the debtor did not originally receive cash or other loan proceeds in exchange for incurring the debt, its cancellation should not be taxable.”99 Professor
Zelenak pointed out that Professor Beck had “an important caveat:
‘Even if the debtor does receive value [at the time the debt originated], no COD income should arise unless the value would have
been taxable absent the debt.’”100 Professor Beck believed that
permitted corporate taxpayers in ‘unsound financial condition’
to exclude the amount of any income attributable to discharge
of indebtedness that was evidenced by a security. In 1942, Congress eliminated the requirement that the corporation be in
unsound financial condition. In the 1954 Code, the rule was rewritten to include individuals as well as corporations. In 1986,
this election was eliminated except for insolvent and bankrupt
taxpayers. When Congress subsequently added two other exemptions, it extended § 108 to apply to them.
Schenk, supra note 12, at 149.
94 See Zelenak, supra note 8, at 280, 294.
95 Id. at 294.
96 Id. at 297.
97 See id.
98 See id.
99 Id. at 297 (quoting Richard C.E. Beck, Is Compromise of a Tax Liability
Itself Taxable? A Problem of Circularity in the Logic of Taxation, 14 VA. TAX
REV. 153, 165–66 (1994)).
100 Id.; see Zelenak, supra note 8, at 298 (quoting Beck, supra note 99, at 167).
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“[i]f the debtor buys or borrows nothing in exchange, incurrence
of a debt is a loss of net worth. Cancellation of such a debt does no
more than restore former net worth and is not gain for precisely
the same reason that a return of capital is not gain.”101
Professors Kahn and Kahn advocated what they refer to as
a “transactional approach” but not the whole transaction methodology as it was applied in Kerbaugh-Empire, which they opine
“had been wrongly decided”102 and resulted in the “transactional
approach to COD issues [being] saddled with a bad reputation.”103
Their formulation of the transactional approach was as follows:
The gist of the transactional approach is to examine the entire
transaction beginning with the creation of the debt and ending
with the cancellation. If the debtor did not obtain a tax benefit
because of the debt, the debtor should not have COD income.
The tax benefit could be the receipt of cash or other property
that would have been income to the debtor if the presence of
the debt had not prevented the recognition of income. The tax
benefit could be a deduction or the acquisition of basis that
was made possible by the presence of the debt.104

Professor Zelenak acknowledged that a “problem [often]
arises of how to identify a no-benefit debt. It is easy enough to
provide a general verbal formulation of the test for a no-benefit
debt but applying the test to particular fact patterns has produced
considerable disagreement among commentators and the courts.”105
An example cited by Professor Zelenak of the difficulty
courts have, at times, applying the no-benefit debt concept was
Bradford v. Commissioner.106 In that case, the taxpayer’s husband owed a bank approximately $305,000.107 He was concerned
that the debt might adversely affect his firm’s seat on the New
York Stock Exchange.108 He convinced the bank to replace part
of his debt with a $205,000 note by his wife “without receiving
See Beck, supra note 99, at 166–67.
See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 164.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 200.
105 See Zelenak, supra note 8, at 297.
106 See generally Bradford v. Comm’r, 233 F.2d 935 (6th Cir. 1956).
107 Id. at 936.
108 Id.
101
102
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any consideration.”109 Her note was later replaced, at the bank’s
request, with two notes, one for $105,000, to which she pledged
collateral, and a note for $100,000, which was unsecured.110 Three
years later, in 1946, after a bank examiner compelled $50,000 of
the second note to be written off, the bank informed the taxpayer
that it was agreeable to sell the $100,000 note for $50,000, and
her brother-in-law purchased the note for $50,000.111 The Tax
Court determined that she had an ordinary income of $50,000.112
The taxpayer appealed this decision on grounds that: 1) this was
essentially a gift from the bank and 2) “that because she received nothing when the note was executed by her ..., she did not
realize income in 1946 when the note was cancelled for less than
its face amount, even if the cancellation was not a gift.”113
The Sixth Circuit, citing Jacobson, among other authorities, indicated that “[w]e cannot say the Tax Court’s ultimate
finding that there was no gift ... was clearly erroneous ....”114 As
to whether the taxpayer had COD income in 1946, the Sixth
Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s decision and held for the taxpayer.115 In its reasoning, the court first rejected the application
of the freeing of assets approach. The court stated that “[a] mechanical application of these principles would of course support
the Tax Court’s decision. Looking alone to the year 1946 ... it is
obvious that when $100,000 of the petitioner’s indebtedness was
discharged for $50,000 in that year, she realized a balance sheet
improvement of $50,000 ....”116 The court then announced that
“[w]e cannot agree with the Commissioner, however, that these
principles are to be applied so mechanically.”117 The court, citing
and discussing Kerbaugh-Empire, observed that it “has been
called ‘a frequently criticized and not easily understood decision[ ]’ ... [but] has not been overruled.”118 The court then stated:
Id.
Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 937.
115 Id. at 939.
116 Id. at 938.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 938–39.
109
110

556 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:537
Whatever validity the Kerbaugh-Empire Co. decision may now
have on its own facts, it remains an authority for the proposition
that in deciding the income tax effect of cancellation of indebtedness for less than its face amount, a court need not in every
case be oblivious to the net effect of the entire transaction.119

The court, then however, pivoted, to a loan proceeds approach.120
Professor Zelenak stated that in Bradford, the Sixth Circuit
“appl[ied] the LP/MC [loan proceeds/mistake correction] theory
to the Tax Court’s no-benefit finding ... [and] concluded that ‘by any
realistic standard the petitioner never realized any income at all
from the transaction’ and ruled in Mrs. Bradford’s favor.”121 The
court based this conclusion on the fact that “[t]he Tax Court unequivocally found as a fact that petitioner received no consideration
when she executed this note ... [and t]his finding is not clearly
erroneous ....”122 While the rejection of the utilization of a balance sheet/net worth test was correct, its application of loan proceeds with net benefit approach is questionable. Professor Zelenak
noted that “[t]he majority view among commentators[, including
himself,] is that Bradford was wrongly decided; the court should
have rejected as clearly erroneous the Tax Court’s findings that
Mrs. Bradford received nothing from the bank in exchange for
the note.”123 He was of the opinion, with which this writer concurs,
“that the [original] debtor substitution ... was the equivalent of
Mrs. Bradford’s borrowing $205,000 cash from the bank and
giving the cash to Mr. Bradford, followed by Mr. Bradford’s using the gifted cash to repay his debt to the bank.”124
As to the focus of this Article, Zarin, Professor Zelenak
opined “that it provides another illustration of how difficult it
sometimes is to apply the LP/MC analysis of COD income, contrary
to the expectation of Bittker and Thompson that COD income analysis would always be simple under the LP/MC framework.”125
Professor Schenk observed that the various theories of
when COD income should or should not occur “do not necessarily
Id. at 939.
Id.
121 Zelenak, supra note 8, at 304 (citing Bradford, 233 U.S. at 938).
122 Bradford, 233 U.S. at 936 n.1.
123 Zelenak, supra note 8, at 304.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 324–25 (referencing Bittker & Thompson, supra note 49, at 1165).
119
120
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produce the same result.”126 She gave as an example, similar to
one offered by other commentators, including Professor Zelenak,127
wherein “T promises to make a payment to X (in a situation that
would not produce a deduction when the payment is made), and
T is ultimately freed from that obligation.”128 She stated that
“[u]nder the freeing-of-assets theory, T would have COD income
because his balance sheet is no longer encumbered by the obligation. Under the loan proceeds theory, however, T would have no
income because he had not received any income or property at
the time he incurred the obligation.”129 She indicated that
“[u]nder the whole transaction approach, it would be necessary
to know what T did with the proceeds of the loan.”130 Professors
Kahn and Kahn, who offered a similar hypothetical, observed
that under their interpretation of the transactional approach,
there would simply be no COD income regardless of what T did
with the money, because all that has happened is that T gave
less or in the case posited by Professor Schenk gave nothing.131
In reaching the above conclusion, Professors Kahn and Kahn
cited an example132 provided by the Second Circuit decision, Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co.133 The hypothetical offered by the
Second Circuit was as follows:
Suppose that a taxpayer validly contracts in 1930 to give $1,000
to a charity in 1931, and in the latter year compromises the
obligation by paying $500 in full settlement. If the taxpayer
returns his income on a cash basis, this transaction cannot
possibly increase his income. The giving of the obligation certainly added nothing to income in 1930, and the payment of it
in 1931 will appear only as a deduction of the sum actually paid
in that year to the use of a charitable corporation. If he were
126 Schenk, supra note 12, at 149. Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak, referring to “freeing of assets” and “loan proceeds” methodologies, commented,
however, that “[t]he choice between two rationales for the taxation of debt cancellation income usually makes no difference, because the same income inclusion
would be required under either rationale.” See CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK,
supra note 27, at 61.
127 See Zelenak, supra note 8, at 294.
128 Schenk, supra note 12, at 149.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 165–66.
132 Id. at 165 n.20.
133 Comm’r v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F.2d 751, 752 (2d Cir. 1932).
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to report on an accrual basis and were allowed to deduct from
gross income for 1930 the $1,000 liability incurred in that year,
then it might be said that the settlement of the liability in 1931
for a less sum had released the difference to general uses of the
taxpayer and the sum so released should appear as income then
received in order that the returns for both years might truly reflect the effect of the whole transaction upon the net income.134

Rail Joint concerned a corporation paying a dividend in the form
of the corporation’s bond with a face value of $2 million.135 These
bonds were later purchased at less than face value with the difference credited to surplus.136 The court distinguished Kirby
Lumber and simply treated this event as a reduction of the dividend.137 The Second Circuit stated that “it is not universally
true that by discharging a liability for less than its face amount
the debtor necessarily receives taxable gain.”138
Id.
Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.; see also Zelenak, supra note 8, at 282. Professor Zelenak, described
the court’s reasoning with the following analysis:
Because the taxpayer received nothing of value when it issued
the bonds as dividends ... the overall transaction did not result in
any economic gain or any taxable gain .... “In paying dividends
to shareholders, the corporation does not buy property from
them. Here the [taxpayer] never received any increment to its
assets, either at the time the bonds were delivered or at the
time they were retired.”
Id. Professor Zelenak noted, however, that:
There is a split among the commentators who have considered
whether the Rail Joint court properly applied LP/MC [ loan
proceeds/mistake correction] analysis. The split is based on
disagreement as to whether the taxpayer received anything of
value when it distributed a dividend in the form of its own
debt. Six commentators (including two co-authors) agree with
the Second Circuit’s assumption that the taxpayer received
nothing of value when it issued the bonds, and so agree with
the court’s conclusion that the taxpayer had no COD income
when it repurchased the bonds at a discount. Four other
commentators (including two co-authors), however, claim that
the Second Circuit was wrong, either because the bond dividend should be analogized to a sale of bonds to third parties
for cash followed by the distribution of the cash proceeds to
shareholders, or because a corporation should be understood
as receiving a benefit analogous to a human being’s personal
134
135
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Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak posited another fact
pattern where utilizing different methodologies involving the determination of COD income could result in dissimilar outcomes.139
This example involved a pedestrian, negligently injured by an
uninsured motorist, who received a $100,000 judgment.140 Because of difficulty in collecting, the pedestrian accepted $80,000,
and gave up his claim to the remaining $20,000.141 Does the
motorist have COD income?142 Under the freeing of assets approach he would have COD income; “his net worth increase[d] by
$20,000 when liabilities decrease[d] by $100,000 while assets
decrease[d] by only $80,000.”143 Under the loan proceeds approach,
which they indicated “should be the sole theory of debtcancellation income, ... the result [should be] that the $20,000
debt cancellation should not be taxed to the negligent motorist.”144
Presumably, under their version of the transactional approach,
Professors Kahn and Kahn would also reach the result that
there was no COD income.145
There are other theories of when COD income should be
determined to occur. Another approach, advocated by Professor
James L. Musselman, was that:
when a taxpayer has received a discharge of indebtedness, it
must simply be determined whether such discharge resulted
in a clearly realized accession to the taxpayer’s wealth, and in
consumption when it distributes value—including value in the
form of its own bonds—to its shareholders.
Id. at 299 (footnotes omitted). Professor Zelenak is of the opinion that while “[i]t
is a close call ... [o]n balance, the argument in favor of COD income in the Rail
Joint situation, based on the concept of dividends as the corporate analogue
to personal consumption, should probably prevail.” Id. at 303.
139 CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 27, at 62–63.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 63.
142 See id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 63. Professor Zelenak expanded upon the negligent tortfeasor hypothetical in his Virginia Tax Review article. He wrote that “[t]he commentators who have considered this situation are in agreement that it produces no
COD income under the LP/MC analysis, because the taxpayer received nothing
of value when the debt arose.” Zelenak, supra note 8, at 313–14.
145 See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 166 (“If any part of the debt is forgiven, it then becomes clear that the assumption of a repayment of that part
of the debt was mistaken.”).
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what amount. ... [T]he amount of any such accession to wealth
is determined by the value of anything the taxpayer received
as a result of any such discharge of indebtedness, as with any
other gross income issue. When determining the value received
from the discharge of indebtedness, it is necessary to evaluate
the transaction that initially created the indebtedness since any
value the taxpayer received from a discharge of indebtedness
would have been received at that time. Notably, the value received by the taxpayer at the time of the transaction initially
creating the indebtedness would not have been included in the
taxpayer’s gross income at that time because the receipt of such
value coincided with the creation of the indebtedness by the taxpayer, thus resulting in no accession to the taxpayer’s wealth.146

Professor Musselman acknowledged that his “proposal resembles,
to an extent, the ‘loan proceeds theory’ [except that] ... [t]he ‘loan
proceeds theory’ assumes that the taxpayer, in all cases in which
he incurs an obligation, received value equal in amount to the
obligation incurred.”147 Under Professor Musselman’s proposal
“that assumption is inapplicable in [what he characterized as]
appropriate situations.”148
Professor Musselman discussed his proposed methodology
with respect to an obligation for services, which is germane to
Zarin.149 He posited an example wherein “a taxpayer agrees to
pay an accountant $1,000 to prepare his tax return. After preparing and filing the return, the taxpayer is discharged from the
$1,000 obligation.”150 While he indicated that the taxpayer would
generally have $1,000 of COD income, “[i]f the taxpayer, in a case
with appropriate facts, can show that he received value in a lesser
amount than the debt incurred, he should not have income from
the discharge of such debt in excess of the value received.”151
One example of where the clarified loan proceeds methodology advocated by Professor Zelenak152 differs from Professor
Musselman, supra note 6, at 632–33 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 633 n.160 (citations omitted).
148 Id. (citation omitted).
149 See id. at 635.
150 Id. at 634–35.
151 Id. at 635 (footnote omitted); Professor Musselman noted that Professor
Dodge achieved a similar outcome under the latter’s belief that “the purchase-price
adjustment doctrine exists outside of section 108(e)(5) ....” Id. at 635 n.170 (citing
Dodge, supra note 19, at 682). This is discussed further below.
152 Professor Zelenak used the terminology “transactional accounting” and
“whole-transaction analysis.” Zelenak, supra note 8, at 280, 294.
146
147
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Musselman’s proposed approach involved federal tax liabilities
that are avoided due to a statute of limitations.153 For example,
the taxpayer owed a certain amount of tax, e.g., $50,000 but the
taxpayer “fails to pay the liability and for whatever reason, the
statute of limitations for collecting such liability expires.”154 Under
Professor Musselman’s methodology, there would be COD, because his “focus [was] on whether the taxpayer received anything of
value when the obligation was created,”155 and he presumed a
benefit from the government commensurate with the tax originally owed.156 He explained that “[t]ax obligations are imposed on
taxpayers by operation of law ..., and all taxpayers receive some
level of benefit as a result .... It makes good policy to presume
that the value received is equal to the obligation imposed ....”157
Therefore it makes sense to “force gross income from discharge
of indebtedness on taxpayers to the extent they are relieved of
their obligations to pay their tax liabilities.”158 In contrast, Professor Zelenak asserted that “[b]ecause the taxpayer whose federal income tax liability is cancelled receives no benefit excluded
from income by reason of the existence of the federal income tax
liability, under the LP/MC analysis he should have no COD income from the cancellation.”159
Finally, it is important to briefly examine the interplay
between the judicial concepts and the Code with respect to COD
income, which is important in examining Zarin. Professors
McMahon and Simmons indicated that one must “[r]ecognize
that section 61(a)(12) [now 61(a)(11)] and judicial precedents and
section 108 provides overriding and supplemental rules.”160 They
expressed their opinion that “because of the extensive detail in
section 108, even when not expressly provided for by the statute,
the Service and the courts tend to treat section 108 as providing
the exclusive rules, supplanting prior judicial decisions with respect
to issues that are addressed in the statutory provision.”161 They
See Musselman, supra note 6, at 654.
See id.; see also Zelenak, supra note 8, at 316.
155 Musselman, supra note 6, at 654.
156 See id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Zelenak, supra note 8, at 316.
160 McMahon & Simmons, supra note 3, at 425.
161 Id. at 425–26 (footnote omitted).
153
154
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did, however, recognize that “[s]ome judicial exceptions nevertheless
survive in cases not addressed by section 108.”162 Professor
Dodge expressed a somewhat contradictory view when he wrote
in the context of Zarin, “[t]he parameters of such income [i.e.,
COD income] are determined neither by § 108 nor the § 61 regulations, but rather by the evolving ‘common law’ of gross income.”163
II.ZARIN V. COMMISSIONER
A. Facts & Tax Court Opinion
David Zarin and his wife, who filed jointly, were in Tax
Court contesting a deficiency by the Service.164 This matter concerned an alleged $2.935 million of cancellation of indebtedness
income in 1981 from the partial discharge of gambling loans received by Mr. Zarin.165 David Zarin “was a professional engineer
involved in the development, construction, and management of
various housing projects.”166 He was also a compulsive gambler,
who by January 1980 “was gambling 12–16 hours per day, 7
days per week [and] was not aware of the amount of his gambling debts.”167 His plight was described by one scholar as a “pitiable tale.”168
While Zarin had gambled elsewhere, he began gambling at
Resorts International Hotel, Inc. (Resorts) after New Jersey legalized casino gambling in Atlantic City, New Jersey.169 He applied
for a $10,000 line of credit for gambling from Resorts on June
1978, which was approved despite some derogatory information.170
This was increased to $200,000 in November 1979 without a further
Id. at 426 (footnote omitted).
Dodge, supra note 19, at 677–78.
164 Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 111 (3d Cir. 1990).
165 Id. In the Third Circuit opinion, the court observed that the Service initially “determined deficiencies in Zarin’s federal income taxes for 1980 and
1981, arguing that Zarin recognized $3,435,000 of income in 1980 from larceny by trick and deception. After Zarin challenged that claim by filing a Tax
Court petition, the Commissioner abandoned his 1980 claim ....” Id. at 112.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 1088.
168 Babette B. Barton, Legal and Tax Incidents of Compulsive Behavior:
Lessons from Zarin, 45 TAX L., 749, 749 (1992).
169 See Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1085 (1989).
170 Id.
162
163
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credit check.171 It was further increased to $215,000 in April 1980,
again without an additional credit inquiry.172
Line of credit gamblers, such as Zarin, were “able to receive chips at the gambling table. Patrons of New Jersey casinos
may not gamble with currency, but must use chips provided by
the casino. Chips may not be used outside the casino where they
were issued for any purpose.”173 In order to obtain the chips Zarin
signed “counter checks, commonly known as ‘markers.’ The markers
were negotiable drafts payable to Resorts drawn on petitioner’s
bank. The markers made no reference to chips, but stated that
cash had been received.”174 Zarin and the Resort’s credit manager
agreed that his “markers would be held for the maximum period
allowable under New Jersey law, which at that time was 90 days,
whereupon [he] would redeem them with a personal check.”175
Zarin focused on playing mainly craps, and “usually bet the
table limit,”176 which was increased, at Zarin’s request, “to the house
maximum.”177 He became a Resorts “valued gaming patron”178 and
he and his guests received various complimentary perks including a luxurious suite, free meals and the use of a limousine.179
The Tax Court indicated that “[a]t all times pertinent hereto,
[Zarin] intended to repay any credit amount properly extended
to him by Resorts and to pay Resorts in full the amount of any
personal check given by him to pay for chips or to reduce his
gambling debt.”180 In fact, he paid back to Resorts approximately
$2.5 million incurred between June 1978 and June 1979.181
A complaint was filed in October 1979 by the New Jersey
Division of Gaming Enforcement with the New Jersey Casino
Control Commission alleging “809 violations pertaining to Resorts’
casino gaming credit system, its internal procedures, and its
administrative and accounting controls[ ] ... [with] 100 [of those
Id. at 1086.
Id. at 1088.
173 Id. at 1086.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 1086.
176 Id. at 1085.
177 Id. at 1086.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 1086–87.
181 Id. at 1087.
171
172
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violations] specifically identified as pertaining to [Zarin] and a
gambling companion.”182 This resulted in the Casino Control Commission issuing an emergency cease and desist order that included the following:
Effective immediately, Resorts shall not issue credit to any
patron whose patron credit reference card indicates that the
credit now outstanding exceeds the properly approved credit
limit. In determining whether a credit limit has been exceeded, all yet undeposited checks received in payment of a counter check or checks shall be included as credits.183

Resorts adopted a policy, put in place after the order was
issued, that treated Zarin’s “personal checks as ‘considered
cleared.’”184 As a result, Zarin’s personal checks were “treated as
a cash transaction, and the amount of [each] check was not included in determining whether he had reached his permanent
credit limit.”185 Furthermore, “Resorts extended petitioner’s credit
limit by giving him temporary increases known as ‘this trip only’
credit.”186 The Tax Court pointed out that “[a]lthough not specifically addressed by the New Jersey Casino Control regulations
in effect during 1979 and 1980, a ‘this trip only’ credit increase
was a temporary credit increase for a patron’s current trip to
Atlantic City, and was required to be reduced before the patron’s
return.”187 The Tax Court observed that “[b]oth of these practices
effectively ignored the emergency order.”188 In 1983, “Resorts was
fined $130,000 for violating the Emergency Order on at least 13
different occasions, 9 of which pertained directly to credit transactions [with Zarin].”189
According to the court, “[d]uring April 1980, petitioner delivered personal checks and markers in the total amount of
$3,435,000 that were returned to Resorts as having been drawn
against insufficient funds.”190 Zarin’s line of credit with Resorts
Id.
Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 1088.
190 Id.
182
183

2021]

ZARIN V. COMMISSIONER REVISITED

565

was cut off on April 29, 1980.191 Although Zarin told Resorts chief
executive officer that he intended to repay the debt, he didn’t do
so and in November 1980, “Resorts filed a complaint in New
Jersey State Court seeking collection of $3,435,000 from [Zarin]
based on the unpaid personal checks and markers.”192 Zarin did
file an answer to the complaint, in which he denied “the allegations and assert[ed] a variety of affirmative defenses.”193 In September 1981 the lawsuit was settled with Zarin “agreeing to make
a series of payments totaling $500,000.”194 The difference between
this amount and original indebtedness of $3.435 million was the
$2.935 million COD income in question before the Tax Court.195
Sitting en banc, the Tax Court held that Zarin had COD
income as a result of the settlement with Resorts, although the
Tax Court judges were divided on this question eleven to eight.196
In reaching this result the court rejected the taxpayer’s assertions that there should be no COD income because: 1) “the debt
instruments were not enforceable under New Jersey law”;197 2)
“gambling and debts incurred to acquire gambling opportunity
have always received special treatment at common law and in
the Internal Revenue Code”;198 3) the settlement constituted a
purchase-money debt reduction that was excluded from gross
income pursuant to section 108(e)(5);199 4) finding for the Service
“would result in taxing petitioner on his losses”;200 5) “settlement of disputed debts does not give rise to income;”201 and 6)
“any income from discharge of his gambling debt was income
from gambling against which he may offset his losses.”202
The court first determined that the burden of proof was
on the Service.203 The court reasoned that the issue was “a new
Id.
Id.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 See id.
196 See generally id.
197 Id. at 1090.
198 Id. (citing United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238 (10th Cir. 1962)).
199 See id. at 1097–98.
200 Id. at 1090.
201 Id. at 1095.
202 Id. at 1096.
203 See id. at 1088.
191
192
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matter,”204 since the Service was now asserting the deficiency
based on COD income for 1981 which “clearly requires different
evidence from the ground originally asserted in the notice of
deficiency, that the income was received in 1980 from larceny by
trick and deception.”205 As such, the court indicated that because
the Service “bears the burden of proof, [it] can prevail only if the
stipulated facts support a conclusion that a discharge of indebtedness occurred that resulted in taxable income under the law.”206
The Tax Court noted that while the general rule in the
Code is that “gross income includes all income from whatever
source derived, including income from the discharge of indebtedness[,] ... [n]ot all discharges of indebtedness, however, result
in income.”207 As to the latter point, the court quoted from the
applicable regulations that “[t]he discharge of indebtedness, in
whole or in part, may result in the realization of income.”208
At least initially, the Tax Court seemingly embraced the
“freeing of assets” theory, observing that “[t]he gain to the debtor
from such discharge is the resultant freeing up of his assets that
he would otherwise have been required to use to pay the debt.”209
The court’s reasoning later, however, altered to more of a loan replacement approach.210 This included the statement concluding
the taxpayer did receive value at the time he incurred the debt
and that only his promise to repay the value received prevented
taxation of the value received at the time of the credit transaction.
When, in the subsequent year, a portion of the obligation to
repay was forgiven ... [this caused section 61(a)(12) to apply].211

As discussed below, this loan proceeds approach was also evidenced
by the discussion of Tufts and its requirement for symmetry.212 It
should be observed that the taxpayer in arguing that he had no
COD income because the obligation was unenforceable, asserted
Id. at 1089.
Id.
206 Id. at 1090.
207 Id. at 1089 (citing I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (currently I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(11), 1.6112(a)).
208 Id. (citing Reg. § 1.61-12(a)) (emphasis in opinion).
209 Id. (citing United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931)).
210 See id. at 1094.
211 Id. at 1094.
212 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
204
205
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that under the freeing of assets theory “[its] discharge ... had no
effect whatsoever on his net worth and could [thus] not result in
debt discharge income.”213
As noted, Zarin cited Hall in support of his position that
gambling debts are treated differently from other obligations.214
While Hall was not found to be compelling precedent by the Tax
Court, the Third Circuit disagreed.215 In Hall, “the taxpayer
transferred appreciated property in satisfaction of a gambling
debt of an undetermined amount incurred in Las Vegas, Nevada.
The Commissioner sought to tax as gain the difference between
the amount of the discharged debt and the basis of the appreciated property.”216 Gambling debts were unenforceable in Nevada.217
The Tenth Circuit stated in Hall that “[t]he general rules relied
upon by the government as having application to gain realized
from cancellation of debt, sound as such rules may be in the ordinary course of business affairs, are but artificial theory when
applied to the facts of the case at bar.”218 Furthermore, it stated
“Congress has recognized that gain and loss from gambling requires special treatment within the tax structure ... [and that] a
gambling debt ... does not meet the requirements of debt necessary to justify the mechanical operation of general rules of tax law
relating to cancellation of debt.”219 The Tenth Circuit also indicated that “[t]he cold fact is that taxpayer suffered a substantial loss
from gambling”220 and “conclude[d] that under the circumstances
of the case” that taxpayer did not have taxable income.221
The Zarin Tax Court dispensed with Hall by tying the decision to Kerbaugh-Empire, perhaps questionably, at least according
to the Third Circuit in Zarin.222 The Tax Court pointed out that
Theodore P. Seto, Inside Zarin, 59 S.M.U. L. REV. 1761, 1776 (2006)
(citing Opening Brief for Petitioner, at 62–63, Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084
(1989) (No. 21371-86)).
214 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1090.
215 Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 115–16 (3d Cir. 1990).
216 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1091.
217 Id.
218 United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238, 241 (10th Cir. 1962).
219 Id. (citations omitted).
220 Id.
221 Id. at 242.
222 Id. As discussed infra, the Third Circuit believed that Hall’s reliance on
Kerbaugh-Empire was limited to “the proposition that ‘a court need not in
every case be oblivious to the net effect of the entire transaction.’” Zarin, 916
213
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the Tenth Circuit in Hall, “relied on the so-called ‘diminution of loss
theory’ developed by the Supreme Court in Bowers v. KerbaughEmpire .... ”223 The Tax Court explained that in Kerbaugh-Empire,
“the taxpayer borrowed money that was subsequently lost in a
business transaction. The debt was satisfied for less than its face
amount. The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer was not required to recognize income from discharge of a debt because the
transaction as a whole lost money.”224
The Tax Court in Zarin pointed out that Kerbaugh-Empire
“has lost its vitality.”225 It cited Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner,226
wherein the Ninth Circuit concluded that “the principles of Kerbaugh-Empire had been rejected by the Supreme Court in the
subsequent cases ... even though the 1926 case had not been
specifically overruled ....”227
In terms of the enforceability of the obligation in New
Jersey, the court stated that the “[l]egal enforceability of an obligation to repay is not determinative of whether the receipt of
money or property is taxable .... The enforceability of petitioner’s
debts under New Jersey law did not affect either the timing or
the amount and thus is not determinative for federal income tax
purposes.”228 It thus ignored the fact that in Hall, the Tenth
Circuit, indicated that “a gambling debt [is] unenforceable in
every state,”229 which may have factored in the Tenth Circuit
reaching its decision.230
Very importantly, the Tax Court also cited and discussed
Commissioner v. Tufts, holding that “upon sale of mortgaged
property, the seller–original borrower must include the amount
of the nonrecourse mortgage assumed by the purchaser in calculating the amount realized from sale, even when the fair market
F.2d at 116 n.11 (quoting Hall, 307 F.2d at 242); see infra Section II.B. Professor Babette B. Barton also concluded that “[t]he majority opinion of the Tax
Court in Zarin erroneously concluded that the Hall case relied on KerbaughEmpire Co.” Barton, supra note 168, at 756 n.43.
223 Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1091 (1989)
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Vukasovich, Inc. v. Comm’r, 790 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1986).
227 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1093.
228 Id. at 1094, 1095.
229 United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238, 241 (10th Cir. 1962).
230 See id. at 242.
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value of the property is less than the outstanding amount of the
nonrecourse obligation.”231 The Tax Court stressed that the Tufts
rationale was based on symmetry:
[T]hat the original inclusion of the amount of the mortgage in
basis rested on the assumption that the mortgagor incurred
an obligation to repay .... Unless the outstanding amount of the
mortgage is deemed to be realized, the mortgagor effectively
will have received untaxed income at the time the loan was
extended and will have received an unwarranted increase in
the basis of his property ....232

The Tax Court then indicated that
symmetry from year to year is not accomplished unless we
treat petitioner’s receipt of the loan from Resorts ... and the
subsequent discharge of his obligation to repay that loan in a
consistent manner. [Zarin] received credit of $3,435,000 from
Resorts. He treated these amounts as a loan, not reporting
any income on his 1980 tax return.233

The Tax Court also rejected the notion that due to the precedent of Kerbaugh-Empire, Zarin’s loss of the loan proceeds should
have shielded him from COD income.234 The Tax Court also declared that “[w]e are not persuaded that gambling debts should be
accorded any special treatment for the benefit of the gambler—
compulsive or not.”235
The Tax Court similarly denied application of the contested
liability/disputed debt exception to COD income that was recognized
by the Board of Tax Appeals in N. Sobel, Inc. v. Commissioner,236 a
case cited by the taxpayer.237 By way of background, where applicable, the contested liability (also known as disputed debt) doctrine
provides that “settlement of a claim does not result in realization
of [COD] income if there is a bona fide dispute regarding the
Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1092. The taxable income in Tufts, however, was not
determined under § 61(a)(11).
232 Id. (citing United States v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 309–10 (1983)).
233 Id.
234 Id. at 1093–94.
235 Id. at 1095.
236 N. Sobel, Inc. v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 1263, 1265 (1939).
237 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1095–96.
231
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debtor’s liability for the amount claimed by the creditor.”238 Some
scholars including Professors Kahn & Kahn, however, are of the
view that “there is either no contested liability exclusion [to
COD] income or there should not be.”239
With reasoning similar to a later decision, Preslar v.
Commissioner,240 discussed infra, the Tax Court stated that “[p]rior
to the settlement, the amount of petitioner’s gambling debt to
Resorts was a liquidated amount, unlike the taxpayer’s debt in
Hall.”241 Zarin had “at the time the debt was created ... agreed
and intended to repay the full amount ... he received full value for
what he agreed to pay, i.e., over $3 million worth of chips and the
benefits received by petitioner as a ‘valued gambling patron’ of
Resorts.”242 Furthermore, the Tax Court asserted, “[t]here is no
dispute about the amount petitioner received .... A genuine dispute does not exist merely because petitioner required Resorts to
sue him before making payment of any amount on the debt.”243
Thus, even though Resorts apparently had concerns about the
debt’s enforceability, which could be at least one of the reasons it
agreed to a heavily discounted $500,000 settlement, the Tax Court,
believed it did not come within a disputed debt exception to recognizing COD income.244 Thus N. Sobel and the contested liability
(disputed debt) doctrine were found to be inapplicable.245
N. Sobel was referred to by the Third Circuit in Zarin, as
“[t]he seminal ‘contested liability’ case.”246 The decision concerned a
taxpayer, who was a dealer in fur skins and had bought stock in
a bank, which he had done business with for many years.247 The
shares were paid for with a promissory note.248 The purchase was
precipitated by “a campaign to sell the bank’s stock ....”249 The note
See McMahon & Simmons, supra note 3, at 435 (footnote omitted).
See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 206.
240 167 F.3d 1323, 1328 (10th Cir. 1999) rev’g & rem’g TC Memo 1996-543
(1996).
241 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1095.
242 Id. at 1096.
243 Id. at 1095–96.
244 Id. at 1096.
245 Id.
246 Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 115 (3d Cr. 1990)
247 N. Sobel, Inc. v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 1263, 1263–64 (1939).
248 Id. at 1264.
249 Id. at 1263.
238
239
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was never paid, and instead the taxpayer “instituted suit against
the bank, demanding rescission of the purchase contract and the
loan and a judgment for the interest paid, on the ground that the
bank made the loan in violation of law and failed to carry out
promises to guarantee the purchaser against loss.”250 The bank
was closed because of insolvency and a countersuit was brought
against the taxpayer by the Superintendent of Banks of the State
of New York.251 The lawsuits were settled with the taxpayer paying
half of the note.252 The Service’s assertion that the remaining
balance of the note was taxable to the company was rejected by
the court, which indicated “that the release of the note was not
the occasion for a freeing of assets and that there was no gain
under the doctrine of Kirby Lumber Co. v. United States ....”253
As will be discussed, the Tenth Circuit in Preslar distinguished
N. Sobel and found the contested liability/disputed debt doctrine
inapplicable in case involving a liquidated debt obligation.254
With respect to the taxpayer’s assertion that he should be
able to offset any COD income with gambling losses, the Tax Court
responded that neither section 165 nor the regulations thereunder
permit such treatment.255 The court stated that Zarin “incurred
gambling losses in 1980, but his gain from the discharge of his gambling debts occurred in 1981. That gain is separate and apart from
the losses he incurred from his actual wagering transactions.”256
As to Zarin’s contention that the settlement with Resorts
should be treated as a “purchase-money debt reduction,”257 and
as such, he was not taxable pursuant to section 108(e)(5), the Tax
Court was equally dismissive.258 It stated “that the value received
by petitioner in exchange for the credit extended by Resorts does
not constitute the type of property to which section 108(e)(5) was
intended to or reasonably can be applied.”259 Section 108(e)(5)
Id. at 1264.
Id.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 1265.
254 Preslar v. Comm’r, 167 F.3d 1323, 1327–28 (10th Cir. 1999).
255 Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1096 (1989).
256 Id.
257 Id. at 1097.
258 Id. at 1098.
259 Id.
250
251
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provides for an exception to COD income for solvent debtors for
a reduction in debt that arose from the purchase of property.260
The Tax Court, citing the provision’s legislative history,
explained that “section 108(e)(5) was enacted ‘to eliminate disagreements between the Internal Revenue Service and the debtor
as to whether, in a particular case to which the provision applies, the debt reductions should be treated as discharge income
or a true price adjustment.’”261 The court reasoned Zarin didn’t
satisfy the statutory requirement of the debt’s connection to the
purchase of property in “that what he received was something
other than normal commercial property .... The ‘property’ argument
simply overemphasizes the significance of the chips. As a matter
of substance, chips in isolation are not what petitioner purchased.”262 Instead, the Tax Court determined Zarin obtained an
“opportunity to gamble.”263 The chips “were a medium of exchange within the Resorts casino, and in that sense, they were a
substitute for cash, just as Federal Reserve Notes, checks, or
other convenient means of representing credit balances constitute or substitute for cash.”264 The chips Zarin received simply
were not the “normal commercial property,”265 to which section
108(e)(5) was intended to apply to.266 As discussed infra, Judge
Stapleton, in his Third Circuit dissenting opinion, raised an
alternative ground for why the section was not appropriate in
Zarin; the section can only function when the taxpayer still
holds the property in question when the settlement occurred.267
Thus, even if the gambling chips constituted the type of property
that section 108(e)(5) was intended to cover, Zarin did not possess them at settlement, which eliminated the basis reduction
quid pro quo intended by Congress.268
Id. at 1097.
Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 96-1035 (1980), 1980-2 C.B. 620, 628).
262 Id. at 1099.
263 Id.
264 Id. at 1100.
265 Id. at 1099.
266 See S. Rep. No. 96-1035 (1980), 1980-2 C.B. 620, 628.
267 Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 118 n.3 (3d Cr. 1990) (Stapleton, J., dissenting).
268 See S. Rep. No. 96-1035 (1980), 1980-2 C.B. 620, 628.
260
261
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Judge Tannenwald made it clear at the beginning of his
dissenting opinion that it was “unnecessary to rely on KerbaughEmpire.”269 Instead, he observed that Zarin is unlike all other
decisions involving COD income wherein “the taxpayer had, in a
prior year when the indebtedness was created, received a nontaxable benefit clearly measurable in monetary terms which would
remain untaxed if the subsequent cancellation of the indebtedness
were held to be tax free.”270 While this reference seems to apply the
loan proceeds approach, like the majority opinion the methodology
utilized was not consistent. Later in the opinion he referred to the
“freeing of assets” theory when he wrote that, “I think it significant that because the debts involved herein were unenforceable
from the moment that they were created, there was no freeing up
of petitioners’ assets when they were discharged ... and therefore
there was no increase in petitioners’ wealth that could constitute
income.”271 He also referred to a “freeing of asset approach” in
conjunction with the discussion of Kerbaugh-Empire.272
His view was apparently that Zarin didn’t receive the
functional equivalent of $3.435 million from Resorts.273 In a
footnote, he remarks that “I think it clear that, although theoretically the chips could have been redeemed for cash instead of
being used for gambling, any attempt by Mr. Zarin to follow this
path would have been known to Resorts’ personnel and strongly
resisted.”274 What if Zarin, not implausibly, got help with his
addiction, and decided it was time to cash in his chips? Would
Zarin, an educated engineer and successful businessman, undoubtedly familiar with capable lawyers, not be able to do so?
This assertion by Judge Tannenwald was certainly questionable.
Judge Tannenwald also remarked that “[t]he concept that
petitioner received his money’s worth from the enjoyment of using
the chips (thus equating the pleasure of gambling with increase in
wealth) produces the incongruous result that the more a gambler loses, the greater his pleasure and the larger the increase in
Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1101 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting). He does however note
“that it does not follow from ‘the freeing of asset’ approach ... that KerbaughEmpire is moribund for all purposes.” Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 1103 (citation omitted).
272 Id. at 1101.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 1101 n.1.
269

574 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:537
his wealth.”275 Professor Babette B. Barton provided a very astute
response, stating that
[t]he fact is, however, that a similar incongruity tends to take
shape whenever losses suffered by a debtor motivate the creditor
to excuse the debtor’s obligation .... The size of the canceled
debt ... bears a positive correlation to increased losses of the
debtor. A less than economically-thriving debtor seems the
most likely candidate of COD income.276

Judge Tannenwald also argued that the debt was unenforceable in New Jersey,277 and as such, the fact that Zarin “intended to repay the full amount at the time the debt was created
is ... irrelevant.”278 He rejected the significance of Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States,279 a case cited by the Service and Tax
Court majority, which held “that unenforceability under Nevada
law did not nullify the ‘all events test,’ so as to avoid accruability by
a casino of accounts receivables ... from gambling patrons.”280 He asserted that the case was predicated on the fact that there was
“reasonable expectancy of collection,” which was not the case
with Zarin.281
He believed it “obvious that Mr. Zarin would resist any attempt to collect[ which was demonstrated by t]he fact that such
resistance actually occurred ....”282 Another distinction he contended, which is certainly valid, is that Flamingo Resort “dealt
with the accruability of income to the casino; here the issue is
the existence of income when a gambling debt is discharged.”283
Judge Tannenwald also thought the contested liability
doctrine relevant.284 He asserted that “I do not read ... language
[in N. Sobel and elsewhere] as requiring that Kirby Lumber
Id. at 1101 (footnote omitted).
Barton, supra note 168, at 770.
277 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1101–03 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
278 Id. at 1101.
279 Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States, 664 F.2d 1387, 1390–91 (9th
Cir. 1982).
280 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1102 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
281 Id. at 1102–03.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 1104.
275
276
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must apply unless the amount is unliquidated, where there is a
genuine dispute as to the underlying liability.”285
Professor Seto, whose perspective was that of being one of
Zarin’s lawyers for the Third Circuit appeal,286 was relatively
positive regarding Judge Tannenwald’s dissent.287 While he acknowledged that “Tannenwald’s analysis can be criticized as
technically inadequate[ ] ... [and] that [it] did not offer a sophisticated technical resolution of any of the difficult issues the case
raised,”288 Professor Seto defended Judge Tannenwald for “appealing to common sense ....”289 This included, according to Professor Seto,290 Judge Tannenwald’s being troubled with “the
incongruous result that the more a gambler loses, the greater
his pleasure and the larger the increase in his wealth.”291 Professor Seto was comfortable with Judge “Tannenwald ... rely[ing]
on the traditional rule that debt must be enforceable to be ‘debt’
and on a simple interpretation of the disputed debt exception to
justify his conclusion that Zarin did not recognize discharge of
indebtedness income in 1981.”292 As discussed further infra, this
writer does not share the opinion of Professors Seto, Zelenak and
some other commentators that essentially Judge Tannenwald got
it right in Zarin.293
Judge Jacobs noted in his separate dissenting opinion that
the obligation to Resorts was invalid and unenforceable.294 As a
result, he would hold it to be “void ab initio, and therefore, ...
[Zarin] realized income ... in 1980 ... to the extent of the value of
Id.
See Seto, supra note 213, at 1764.
287 See id. at 1786.
288 Id.
289 Id. at 1785.
290 Id.
291 Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1101 (1989) (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
292 See Seto, supra note 213, at 1785–86. Professor Seto was critical of the
Tax Court opinion writing that “[t]he majority’s conclusions that a discharge of
unenforceable gambling debt was taxable and that the disputed debt exception
only applied to unliquidated debt were both contrary to precedent—albeit skimpy
precedent. Its reading of § 108(e)(5), as Judge Ruwe’s dissenting opinion
would demonstrate, violated conventional canons of statutory construction.”
Id. at 1777.
293 See supra notes 106–07.
294 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1105 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
285
286
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the chips received.”295 Professor Seto was critical of this approach
because pursuant to James v. United States,296 “a taxpayer may
be charged with income on the receipt of funds if and only if he
received those funds ‘without the consensual recognition, express
or implied, of an obligation to repay.’”297 Zarin clearly had not
met this standard.298
Judge Jacobs’s analysis from this point became even more
problematic. First, he “[would] hold that the amount of petitioner’s losses from wagering activities in 1980 equaled or exceeded
the amount of chip income. [i.e., the $3.435 million of gambling
credit Zarin received in 1980 from Resorts, without an enforceable obligation to repay.]”299 Despite recognizing that section 165(d)
by its terms “limits losses from wagering transactions to the extent
of gains,”300 he found the provision germane.301 Judge Jacobs’s
justification was that “the chip income constitutes gain from a
wagering transaction, because no such income would have been
realized but for the wagering transactions in which petitioner’s
losses occurred.”302
Judge Jacobs also criticized the Tax Court majority opinion for determining Zarin had COD income in 1981, stating that
“[f]or interest on indebtedness to be deductible under section
163, it is well recognized that the indebtedness must be enforceable. ... [The same rule should apply to] the inclusion of discharge of indebtedness income.”303 He simply ignored the fact
that the provisions regarding what is included in gross income and
what is deductible are often not symmetrical. Finally, he seemed
to hint at a Kerbaugh-Empire rationale when he quoted from
Hall that “[i]n deciding the income tax effects of cancellation of
Id. at 1105–06.
James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
297 See Seto, supra note 213, at 1786 (citing James, 366 U.S. at 219). Professor Seto also pointed out that this standard applies “regardless of whether
the obligation was enforceable.” Id. (citing Liddy v. Comm’r, 808 F.2d 312,314
(4th Cir. 1986)). Professor Seto had other issues with Judge Jacobs’s approach
including its impossibility to administer. Id.
298 See id. at 1786–87.
299 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1106 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id. at 1106–07.
295
296
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indebtedness for less than its face amount, a court need not in every
case be oblivious to the net effect of the entire transaction.”304
Judge Ruwe’s dissent, which four other judges joined, focused on their view that section 108(e)(5) was applicable.305 One
commentator indicated that his dissent “from a purely technical
standpoint[ was] probably the best legal argument applied to the
Zarin facts,”306 although, this writer believes section 108(e)(5) was
improper for Zarin on two separate grounds mentioned above and
elaborated on infra, and neither court found the section relevant.307
Judge Ruwe acknowledged that apart from the question
of section 108(e)(5)’s applicability, he “agree[d] with much of the
majority’s reasoning ....”308 He argued that “[t]he parties stipulated that the chips were ‘property[ ]’ ... [and that i]t is beyond
question that gambling chips constitute what is commonly referred to as property.”309 He took issue with “[t]he majority’s
legal conclusion [that] seems to be that gambling chips, being
other than ‘normal commercial property’ [in their judgment], do
not constitute ‘property’ within the meaning of section 108(e)(5).”310
Judge Ruwe asserted that with respect to section 108(e)(5), “neither the statute nor the accompanying legislative history qualify
or restrict the term ‘property.’ No attempt has been made to
specify any limits on the scope of the term. Instead, the term is
used in a broad, comprehensive manner.”311 He was (in this
writer’s opinion incorrectly) derisive of the Service’s position
that “[a] purchase price adjustment [under 108(e)(5)] occurs
when the dispute involves contract liability for the purchase of
Id. at 1107 (citing United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238, 242 (10th Cir. 1962)).
Id. at 1107–16 (Ruwe, J. dissenting).
306 Jon D. Rigney, Zarin v. Commissioner: The Continuing Validity of Case
Law Exceptions to Discharge of Indebtedness Income, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 981,
990 (1991). He did, however, acknowledge that “[t]here are ... sound policy
considerations, explored in the analysis of the Third Circuit opinion, for not
applying the argument [that section 108(e)(5) excluded the debt discharge
from gross income.]” Id. at 990 n.72.
307 See id. at 990–94; supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text; infra Section II.E.
308 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1107 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
309 Id. at 1108.
310 Id.
311 Id. at 1111.
304
305
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an asset.”312 He wrote that “I am unable to discern any basis or
rationale for this argument.”313
He concluded that:
The majority decides an issue of first impression by disregarding the plain language of the statute without any justification
in the statute or legislative history .... I would dispose of this
case by assuming that there was discharge of indebtedness
income. I would then apply section 108(e)(5) to treat the discharge as a purchase price adjustment.314

After losing in Tax Court, Zarin fired his lawyers from
Reid & Priest and retained new counsel at Caplin & Drysdale,
which filed for a rehearing at Tax Court.315 The grounds for the
rehearing motion were primarily based on Zarin being exempt
under the insolvency exception to section 108, section 108(a)(1)(B),
although his original counsel had conceded he was solvent.316
When the motion was denied,317 Zarin changed lawyers once
again for his appeal to the Third Circuit.318 This time, with lawyers from Drinker & Biddle, he hit the jackpot, but did lose the
dice roll in a malpractice suit he filed against Reid & Priest.319
B. Third Circuit Opinion
The Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held for the
taxpayer.320 Professor Seto observed that “[i]n substance, the
Third Circuit majority opinion mirrored Tannenwald’s; it held,
in effect, that Zarin had not received $3.435 million in value and
that the discharge was exempt because Zarin’s debt was unenforceable and disputed.”321 While many, but not all, pundits applaud the outcome, the court’s opinion has been subject to sharp
Id. at 1115.
Id.
314 Id. at 1115–16.
315 See Schenk, supra note 12, at 167 n.21.
316 See Seto, supra note 213, at 1791.
317 Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 112 n.6 (3d Cir. 1990).
318 See Schenk, supra note 12, at 167 n.91.
319 Id.
320 Zarin, 916 F.2d at 117.
321 Seto, supra note 213, at 1791.
312
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rebuke.322 This writer is critical of the Third Circuit’s reasoning
as well as its conclusion. Essentially, the Third Circuit held that
Zarin was not subject to tax for two reasons, either of which
(according to the Third Circuit) would have served to nullify COD
income. First, Section 108(d)(1)’s definition of the term “indebtedness of the taxpayer” was not satisfied, therefor “the cancelation
of indebtedness provisions of the Code [did] not apply to the settlement between Resorts and Zarin."323 Second, the contested
liability (disputed debt) doctrine was applicable because the debt
was determined to be unenforceable.324
The Circuit Court initially determined “that sections 108
and 61(a)(12) were inapplicable ....”325 In reaching these findings,
the court indicated that it looked to section 108(d)(1) as to what
indebtedness meant in section 61(a)(12) because the term was not
defined in section 61.326 Having done so, the court stated that “[i]n
order to come within the sweep of the discharge of indebtedness
rules, ... the [taxpayer] must show that one of the two prongs in
the section 108(d)(1) test is satisfied. Zarin satisfies neither.”327
Section 108(d)(1) provides that “[f]or purposes of this section,
the term ‘indebtedness of the taxpayer’ means any indebtedness—
(A) for which the taxpayer is liable, or (B) subject to which the
taxpayer holds property.”328 The court then focused on the first
of the alternatives for “indebtedness of the taxpayer” and found
that “[b]ecause the debt Zarin owed to Resorts was unenforceable
as a matter of New Jersey state law, it is clearly not a debt ‘for
which the taxpayer is liable.’”329 While, as explained in Judge
Stapleton’s dissent, this determination should only be academic,
See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 11, at 258. That “[g]iven the serious problems with the Third Circuit’s reasoning, one fervently hopes that it will fail to
live on as precedent for any broad proposition of tax law.” Id.
323 Zarin, 916 F.2d at 114.
324 Id.
325 Id. at 113.
326 Id.
327 Id.
328 I.R.C. § 108(d)(1).
329 Zarin, 916 F.2d at 113 (footnote omitted). In an accompanying footnote,
the Third Circuit noted, in part, that “[t]he Tax Court held that the Commissioner had not met its burden of proving that the debt owed Resorts was
enforceable as a matter of state law .... There was ample evidence to support
the finding.” Id. at 113 n.7.
322
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this writer believes it was in error. Professor Babette B. Barton
observed that “[t]he correctness of this interpretation is at the
least questionable in light of the Supreme Court’s expressed
attitudes about the immateriality for tax purposes of whether a
debtor is or is not personally liable for a debt.”330 Professor
Musselman characterized the court’s analysis here as “most
surely incorrect.”331
As to the alternative definition of “indebtedness of the
taxpayer” under section 108(d)(1)(B), the court found that “Zarin
did not have a debt subject to which he held property as required by section 108(d)(1)(B).”332 In doing so, as noted above,
the court implicitly rejected Judge Ruwe’s argument in dissent
and endorsed the Tax Court finding “that gambling chips were
not property, but rather, ‘a medium of exchange within the Resorts casino’ and a ‘substitute for cash.’”333 That is, “the chips
[are] nothing more than ‘the opportunity to gamble ....’”334 The
court further buttressed its conclusion that the chips should not
be regarded as property for purposes of section 108(d)(1)(B) by
asserting that “[e]ven were there no relevant legislative pronouncement [referring to a New Jersey statute referenced above] on
which to rely, simple common sense would lead to the conclusion
that chips were not property in Zarin’s hands.”335 The court pointed
out that “Zarin could not do with the chips as he pleased, nor did
the chips have any independent economic value beyond the casino. The chips themselves were of little use to Zarin, other than
as a means of facilitating gambling.”336 While not addressed by
the Third Circuit, even if the gambling chips constituted property
within the meaning of the statutory provision (which this writer
Barton, supra note 168, at 754–55 (footnote omitted).
Musselman, supra note 6, at 617 (footnote omitted).
332 Zarin, 916 F.2d at 113.
333 Id.
334 Id. The Third Circuit embellished its argument by citing a New Jersey
statute that provided that “gaming chips in New Jersey during 1980 were
regarded ‘solely as evidence of a debt owed to their custodian by the casino
licensee and shall be considered at no time the property of anyone other than
the casino licensee issuing them.’” Id. at 114 (citing N.J. Admin. Code tit.
19k, § 19:46-1.5(d) (1990)).
335 Id.
336 Id.
330
331
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believes would have been incorrect), the taxpayer would not satisfy
the requirement in section 108(d)(1)(B) that the taxpayer “holds
property.”337 The chips were gone when Zarin settled.338 Judge
Stapleton’s observation, in his dissenting opinion that “[s]ection
108(d) expressly defines that term solely for purposes of § 108
and not for purposes of § 61(a)(12),”339 should make the foregoing analysis moot, i.e., even if met, the requirements of section
108(d)(1)(A) (which this writer and many scholars believe he
had) or section 108(d)(1)(B) (which it is fairly clear he did not),
this should not mean he had COD income. Conversely, a failure
to meet both requirements should not have served to relieve him
of COD income.
A major focus of the Third Circuit opinion was on the Tax
Court’s determination that the debt was unenforceable.340 It was
critical to the Third Circuit’s finding, albeit mistaken, that section 108(d)(1)(A) was inapplicable.341 The Third Circuit also decided that the contested liability doctrine was relevant because
the debt was deemed to be unenforceable.342 The Tax Court was
correct in determining that lack of enforceability of the debt does
not serve to shield COD income.343 As Professor Shaviro observed “[t]he lack of legal enforceability hardly seems relevant
here.”344 The focus of the Third Circuit “should [have been]
whether the parties intended to create a debt.”345 As discussed
below, the post-Zarin Tenth Circuit decision in Preslar supported
this view that “[e]nforceability of the debt ... should not affect the
tax treatment of the transaction.”346 In fixating on the enforceability rabbit hole, the Third Circuit failed to focus on some key
I.R.C. § 108(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
Zarin, 916 F.2d at 112, rev’g 92 T.C. 1084 (1989).
339 Id. at 118 n.3 (Stapleton, J., dissenting).
340 Id. at 113.
341 Id.
342 Id. at 115.
343 Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1094–95 (1989).
344 See Shaviro, supra note 11, at 243.
345 Douglas E. Kulper, Taxpayer Rolls the Dice and the IRS Craps out:
Forgiveness of Gambling Debts is Not Income in Zarin v. Commissioner, 1991
UTAH L. REV. 617, 636 (1991).
346 Preslar v. Comm’r, 167 F.3d 1323, 1329 (10th Cir. 1999), rev’g & rem’g
TC Memo 1996-543 (1996).
337
338
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Tax Court findings about the genuine debtor-creditor relationship Zarin had with Resorts. This included that the Tax Court
determined that “[a]t all times pertinent hereto [presumably up
to the time of Resorts’ lawsuit], petitioner intended to ... pay
Resorts in full ....”347 Furthermore, there was no indication that
when Resorts extended Zarin’s credit, it did not expect to be repaid.348 In fact, Zarin had previously paid in full gambling debts
to Resorts of $2.5 million.349
With respect to its alternative grounds for finding Zarin
did not have COD income, i.e., the use of the contested liability (also
known as disputed debt) doctrine, the Third Circuit explained
that “[u]nder the contested liability doctrine, if a taxpayer, in
good faith, disputed the amount of a debt, a subsequent settlement of the dispute would be treated as the amount of debt cognizable for tax purposes.”350
The Third Circuit opinion rejected the Service’s and Tax
Court’s position that the contested liability doctrine has no application to the case at bar because “Zarin’s debt was liquidated ....”351
The Third Circuit’s position was that “[w]hen a debt is unenforceable, it follows that the amount of the debt, and not just the
liability thereon, is in dispute.”352 Furthermore, the court stated
that “[the] dollar value to each chip ... is not beyond dispute ....”353
The court contended that “[i]f indeed the only issue was the enforceability of the entire debt there would have been no settlement .... Such a debt cannot be called liquidated, since its exact
amount was not fixed until settlement.”354 The court’s position
was subject to strong criticism by the Tenth Circuit in Preslar
for failure to distinguish a liquid debt obligation from an illiquid
one.355
Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1086.
Id.
349 Id. at 1087.
350 Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 1990), rev’g 92 T.C. 1084 (1989).
351 Id. at 116.
352 Id.
353 Id.
354 Id.
355 Preslar v. Comm’r, 167 F.3d 1323, 1327–29 (10th Cir. 1999), rev’g &
rem’g TC Memo 1996-543 (1996).
347
348
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The Third Circuit’s position on the application of the contested liability doctrine to Zarin was also undercut by a fallacious
example offered by the court:
Thus, if a taxpayer took out a loan for $10,000, refused in good
faith to pay the full $10,000 back, and then reached an agreement
with the lendor that he would pay back only $7,000 in full satisfaction of the debt, the transaction would be treated as if the
initial loan was $7,000. When the taxpayer tenders the $7,000
payment, he will have been deemed to have paid the full amount
of the initially disputed debt. Accordingly, there is no tax consequence to the taxpayer upon payment.356

The $3,000 should be treated as COD income.357 Professors Kahn and Kahn commented that Third Circuit’s “conclusion
[of its example] is incorrect.”358 They reasoned that “[t]he borrower obtained $10,000 cash and returned only $7,000. The $3,000
cash he received that was not included in his income because of the
debt is now free from any liability.”359 Therefore, “[r]egardless of
what legitimate reasons there might be for the borrower to not
be liable for part of that debt, the borrower must include $3,000
in income when that amount of the debt is cancelled.”360 Professor Seto, commenting on why the Third Circuit opinion was not
given much respect by scholars, noted that “[a]ll well-trained tax
lawyers know that [the Third Circuit example] is ‘wrong’ .... The
effect of the explanation ... was to destroy the credibility of what
might otherwise have been a plausible opinion.”361 Professor
Seto, however, appears to be one of the few commentators who
would characterize the Third Circuit analysis as even close to a
plausible opinion.362
The contested liability doctrine was simply not appropriate to the facts of Zarin. There was no dispute that Resorts
loaned Zarin $3.435 million.363 If Zarin had changed his mind
Zarin, 916 F.2d at 115.
Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 206.
358 Id.
359 Id.
360 Id.
361 Seto, supra note 213, at 1792.
362 See Kulper, supra note 345, at 642; Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 205–
06; Shaviro, supra note 11, at 253–54.
363 See Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 112 (3d Cir. 1990), rev’g 92 T.C.
1084 (1989).
356
357
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about gambling away the proceeds, after perhaps getting help
for his addiction, he could have cashed in his chips and used the
proceeds to extinguish his debt to the extent of the dollar value
of the chips.364 (He in fact, got such help but only after his settlement with Resorts).365 Alternatively, Zarin could have exchanged his chips when he was on a winning streak. Under both
of those circumstances, the amount of the debt would be clearly
equal to the chips which he was entitled to receive, $3.435 million. As to why the parties settled for $500,000, perhaps Resorts
believed that they could not recover anymore from him given his
financial position and decided to forego additional litigation expense. The parties may have instead reached a consensus that
the odds of a court finding the debt was enforceable was unlikely,
but not impossible. As Judge Stapleton described it in his dissenting position, “Resorts settled for 14 cents on the dollar presumably because it viewed such a settlement as reflective of the
odds that the debt would be held to be enforceable.”366 Professor
Barton posited as another possible reason: Resort’s concern
about adverse publicity.367 It could have been a combination of
some or all of these reasons. The fact that the matter was settled
for substantially less than the agreed terms of the original loan
does not mean that the parties disagreed as to the amount of the
original indebtedness. They did not and the debt, therefore,
should be liquid. The settlement did not change a liquid debt to
an illiquid one.
There was also a policy reason as to why the Third Circuit’s position on the application of the contested liability doctrine to Zarin made no sense. One commentator pointed out that
if this position were widely adopted, then “parties will always
Professor Seto pointed out:
New Jersey law prohibited the redemption of a credit gambler’s
chips for cash or their removal from the casino, requiring that
they first be applied against the gambler’s outstanding credit
balance. In effect, the only thing Zarin could have done with
his chips was to pay down his unenforceable debt.
Seto, supra note 213, at 1792.
365 Professor Seto reported that Zarin “joined Gamblers Anonymous and
became Chair of the Advisory Board to the National Foundation for the Study of
Pathological Gambling. He never gambled again.” Id. at 1761 (footnotes omitted).
366 Zarin, 916 F.2d at 118 (Stapleton, J., dissenting).
367 See Barton, supra note 168, at 764.
364
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invoke the disputed debt doctrine to avoid taxation. Thus, taxation
of [COD income from] unenforceable debts will cease. This result
[would] clearly [serve to] frustrate[ ] ... the will of Congress.”368
In its argument as to why the contested liability doctrine
should pertain to Zarin, the Third Circuit also examined and
cited with approval the Tenth Circuit decision in Hall, discussed
above.369 The Third Circuit stated that:
In effect, the [Tenth Circuit in Hall] held that because the
debt was unenforceable, the amount of the loss and resulting
debt cognizable for tax purposes were fixed by the settlement
at $148,110. Thus, the Tenth Circuit lent its endorsement to
the contested liability doctrine in a factual situation strikingly
similar to the one at issue.370

The Third Circuit rejected the Service’s argument that
“the decision in Hall was based on United States Supreme Court
precedent since overruled, and therefore Hall should be disregarded. Indeed, the Hall court devoted a considerable amount of
time to Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire ..., a case whose validity is in
question.”371 The Third Circuit responded that, without deciding
whether Kerbaugh-Empire is still valid, “Hall relied on [KerbaughEmpire] only for the proposition that ‘a court need not in every
case be oblivious to the net effect of the entire transaction.’”372
The later Tenth Circuit decision, Preslar, discussed infra,
certainly marginalized Hall.373 There the court stated:
Whether Hall has continued viability is questionable in light of
the Supreme Court’s holding in Tufts. The emphasis on a taxpayer’s lack of legal obligation to pay a gambling debt in Hall is
difficult to reconcile with Tuft’s disregard of the nonrecourse
nature of a loan in calculating gross income.374

While there was relatively little discussion by the Third
Circuit regarding theories as to when COD income should or should
Kulper, supra note 345, at 642.
See Zarin, 916 F.2d at 115–16.
370 Id.
371 Id. at 116 n.11.
372 Id. (citing United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238, 242 (10th Cir. 1962)).
373 See Preslar v. Comm’r, 167 F.3d 1323, 1329 (10th Cir. 1999).
374 Id.
368
369
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not arise, it relied upon and quoted N. Sobel that “the note forgiven by the bank ‘was not the occasion for a freeing of assets
and that there was no gain ....’”375 Its citation and discussion of
Hall could also be construed as embracing the freeing of assets
approach.376 As discussed below, Professor Chad J. Pomeroy was
of the view that the Third Circuit implicitly utilized the freeing
of assets methodology.377
In a generally well-reasoned and cogent dissent, Third
Circuit Judge Stapleton, without expressly referring to the loan
proceeds theory, effectively utilized this approach (despite some
language suggestive of the freeing of assets methodology) in finding
Zarin had COD income in 1981.378 Judge Stapleton stated that
[d]espite the fact that Zarin received in 1980 cash or an entitlement worth $3.4 million,379 he correctly reported in that year
no income from his dealings with Resorts. He did so solely because he recognized, as evidenced by his notes, an offsetting
obligation to repay Resorts $3.4 million in cash.380

With the settlement in 1981, Judge Stapleton reasoned, “Resorts
surrendered its claim to repayment of the remaining $2.9 million of the money Zarin had borrowed. As of that time, Zarin’s
assets were freed of his potential liability for that amount and
he recognized gross income in that amount.”381 Judge Stapleton
indicated that the alternative of finding that Zarin did not have
income is “unacceptable as inconsistent with the fundamental
principle of the Code that anything of commercial value received
by a taxpayer is taxable unless expressly excluded from gross
income.”382 The other option, i.e., to tax Zarin in 1980 (that was
suggested by Judge Jacobs in his Tax Court dissenting opinion)
Zarin, 916 F.2d at 115 (citing N. Sobel, Inc. v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 1263,
1265 (1939)) (emphasis added).
376 See Pomeroy, supra note 74, at 1694–95.
377 Id. at 1695.
378 See Zarin, 916 F.2d at 117 (Stapleton, J., dissenting).
379 This amount, also referred to in the majority opinion, id. at 116, is apparently rounded version of the actual $3.435 million figure. Id at 117 (citations omitted).
380 Id. (citations omitted).
381 Id. (citations omitted).
382 Id. at 118 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
375
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was, according to Judge Stapleton, “unacceptable as impracticable.”383 He explained that:
[i]n 1980, neither party was maintaining that the debt was
unenforceable and, because of the settlement, its unenforceability was not even established in the litigation over the debt
in 1981. It was not until 1989, in this litigation over the tax
consequences of the transaction, that the unenforceability was
first judicially declared.384

Judge Stapleton concluded that in his view “where something that
would otherwise be includable in gross income is received ... there
should be no recognition of income so long as the debtor continues to
recognize an obligation to repay the debt.”385 He added that, “income, if not earlier recognized, should be recognized when the debtor no longer recognizes an obligation to repay and the creditor
has released the debt or acknowledged its unenforceability.”386
Judge Stapleton used a footnote to address the lack of relevance of sections 108(e)(5) and 108(d)(1).387 As to section
108(e)(5), he stated that “[a]mong other things, § 108(e)(5) necessarily applies only to a situation in which the debtor still holds
the property acquired in the purchase money transaction.”388 As
to the absence of significance of section 108(d)(1) to Zarin, Judge
Stapleton indicated that the literal language of the provision
should apply, i.e., the definition provided is “[f]or purposes of
this section ....”389 He wrote, “[e]qually irrelevant is § 108(d)’s
definition of ‘indebtedness’ relied upon heavily by the court. Section 108(d) expressly defines that term solely for the purposes of
§ 108 and not for the purposes of § 61(a)(12).”390 While moot if
one accepts the Third Circuit majority findings that Zarin did
not meet either section 108(d)(1)(A) “[indebtedness] for which
the taxpayer is liable” (a very dubious judgment) and section
108(d)(1)(B) because he did not “have a debt subject to which he
Id.
Id.
385 Id.
386 Id. (footnote omitted).
387 See id. at 118 n.3.
388 Id. He did not address whether he believed the chips were “property”
for this purpose, presumably because he thought it moot. Id.
389 I.R.C. § 108(d)(1).
390 Zarin, 916 F.2d at 118 n.3 (Stapleton, J., dissenting).
383
384
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held property as required by section 108(d)(1)(B),”391 the scholars
are divided as to Judge Stapleton’s reasoning as to the limited
scope of section 108(d)(1).392
Professor Shaviro found merit in Judge Stapleton’s assessment.393 He noted that:
Section 61(a) is a provision of broad inclusion, listing items
within the ambit of gross income, while § 108 serves to carve
out specific exceptions to the broad reach of § 61(a). It is plausible that only a subset of all cancellation of indebtedness income, conceived in the broadest sense, would be made eligible
for the carveout.394

Professor Dodge apparently concurred,395 as does this writer.
This, however, was disputed by Professor Seto, who stated that
[t]he history of § 108 and its predecessor sections strongly suggests that it was intended to address whatever ‘debt’ might
otherwise be subject to the discharge of indebtedness doctrine. ... [Section] 61(a)(12) was apparently added only for
purposes of completeness and has never previously been construed as having independent substantive effect.396

Professor Seto added that “[t]o hold that § 61(a)(12) encompasses discharges of unenforceable debt but that § 108 does not
would lead to very peculiar results. A discharge of unenforceable
debt, for example, would be income, but would be ineligible for
the statutory insolvency exception of I.R.C. § 108(a).”397
Id. at 113. Zarin’s failure to satisfy section 108(d)(1)(B) is self-evident,
i.e., he did not possess the chips when the debt was settled. Id.
392 See Shaviro, supra note 11, at 253; Dodge, supra note 19, at 677–78;
Seto, supra note 213, at 1792.
393 See Shaviro, supra note 11, at 253. Professor Musselman also agreed.
See Musselman, supra note 6, at 617.
394 Shaviro, supra note 11, at 253.
395 See Dodge, supra note 19, at 677–78 (“The parameters of [COD] income
are determined neither by § 108 nor the § 61 regulations, but rather by the
evolving ‘common law’ of gross income.”). Professor Barton also appeared to
be in agreement, when she wrote that “[a] determination of the inapplicability of section 108 to the unenforceable gambling debt should have shifted the
inquiry to why the discharge occurred, and to whether a discharge for that
reason amounted to a taxable accession to wealth.” Barton, supra note 168, at
755 (footnote omitted).
396 Seto, supra note 213, at 1792 n. 199.
397 Id.
391

2021]

ZARIN V. COMMISSIONER REVISITED

589

As an aside, Professor Shaviro thought that one of the
several failings with the Third Circuit’s reasoning was that even
if Zarin’s income was determined to be excluded from being
treated as COD income, he could still be taxed under the broad
reach of section 61.398 He argued that “[w]hen a taxpayer receives something of value in a commercial setting, the government does not have the burden to show what type of income it
constitutes.”399 That is, assuming arguendo that Zarin did not
meet the requirements of section 108(d)(1)(A) or (B) and that
such failure applied to whether he had income under then section 61(a)(12), he could still be found to have taxable income in
1981 from the settlement.400
C. Scholarly Commentary
Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak wrote that “[o]nly a
grouch would object to the outcome in Zarin.”401 According to
Professor Schenk “[t]he vast majority of commentators think that
Zarin did not have COD income.”402 Defending the Tax Court’s
decision that he should be taxed is somewhat daunting in light
of the forgoing and that he is a somewhat sympathetic figure
who lost a sizeable amount of money from pursuing the adrenaline rush of gambling that was certainly encouraged by Resorts.
Furthermore, given his 70% tax bracket in 1981 he would have
owed about $5.2 million, despite being out of pocket $500,000
from the settlement with Resorts, had he lost his appeal.403
As a start, it is useful to review some of the comments and
arguments made by a few of the scholars regarding the Zarin
decisions. This writer’s brief snippets certainly do not do justice
to some brilliant scholarship that was engendered by Zarin.
Professor Calvin Johnson, who vehemently disagreed that
the contested liability/disputed debt doctrine was applicable to
Zarin, utilized the Third Circuit’s flawed hypothetical to make his
See Shaviro, supra note 11, at 253.
See id.
400 See id.
401 CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 27, at 64.
402 Schenk, supra note 12, at 169 n.100.
403 Id. at 167.
398
399
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argument.404 He contended that “[t]here is ... a simple straightforward reason why Zarin should win: The 1981 forgiveness of his
markers was a recovery of an expense for which Zarin had no prior
tax benefit. Zarin has no income under the exclusionary, protaxpayer branch of the tax benefit rule.”405 Professor Johnson
stated that:
[u]nder the exclusionary or pro-taxpayer branch of the tax benefit
rule, a taxpayer may exclude the recovery of an expenditure from
income, where the expenditure gave the taxpayer no prior tax
benefit. The taxpayer may be viewed as, in effect, having a
basis in the expenditure, which the taxpayer may use to shelter the recovery from tax, provided the expenditure did not
previously generate a tax savings.406

Professor Johnson asserted that “Zarin had a recovery of
his prior losses when he failed to pay for the chips gambled
away in the prior years and the recovery was an exempt recovery of an item without prior tax benefit.”407
Professor Musselman would also find for Zarin (at least
with respect to some, if not all, of the income),408 although he too
had problems with the Third Circuit’s reasoning,409 but did not
subscribe to Professor Johnson’s analysis.410 Under Professor
Musselman’s proposed methodology for determining whether a
taxpayer has COD income, discussed above,
it must simply be determined whether such discharge resulted in a clearly realized accession to the taxpayer’s wealth, and
in what amount ... the amount of any such accession to wealth
is determined by the value of anything the taxpayer received
as a result of any such discharge of indebtedness ....411

Under his approach, normally in
Calvin H. Johnson, Zarin and the Tax Benefit Rule: Tax Models for
Gambling Losses and the Forgiveness of Gambling Debts, 45 N.Y.U. TAX L.
REV. 697, 697–99 (1990).
405 Id. at 697–98.
406 Id. at 700–01.
407 Id. at 706.
408 See Musselman, supra note 6, at 644.
409 See id. at 617–18.
410 See id. at 630–31.
411 Id. at 632–33 (footnotes omitted).
404
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an arm’s length agreement to incur a debt in exchange for
services should ... result in a legal presumption that the value
of the services received by the taxpayer is equal to the amount
the taxpayer agreed to pay for them, [but Zarin presented exigent circumstances including his compulsive gambling and
Resorts illegally extending him credit].412

These factors, Professor Musselman believed, “g[i]ve rise to a
serious question of whether the taxpayer received value in a lesser
amount than the debt incurred.”413
Professors Kahn and Kahn believed Zarin should not have
had COD income.414 They asserted that “[t]he cancellation of the
debt in Zarin can be seen through the transactional approach as
nothing more than a reduction of the cost of the gambling experience.”415 They reason “that the taxpayer never received anything of value whose purchase price could not be adjusted when
the amount of the debt was reduced.”416 They shared, with many
other scholars, a negative view of the Third Circuit opinion,
writing that “the Third Circuit advanced two independent rationales neither of which is convincing.”417
Professor Stephen A. Zorn suggested viewing Zarin “from
the point of view of the casino, and use its expected return in
advancing the money to the taxpayer in Zarin as a measure of
the amount gambled.”418 He believed that:
the unenforceability of gambling debts (at least through the
courts) would be a legitimate factor to consider, and a court
might well reach the conclusion that, in advancing $3.4 million of in-house gambling credit to the taxpayer, the casino in
fact had a reasonable expectation of receiving not more than
the $500,000 that it ultimately received ....419

Id. at 644 (footnote omitted).
Id. (footnote omitted).
414 See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 203–06.
415 Id. at 206.
416 Id. at 205.
417 Id. at 203.
418 Stephen A. Zorn, The Federal Income Tax Treatment of Gambling: Fairness
or Obsolete Moralism?, 49 TAX L. 1, 33 (1995).
419 Id.
412
413
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Therefore, Professor Zorn was of the view that “there
would be no discharge of indebtedness income.”420 One problem
with this approach is that it requires a court to determine that
Resorts never expected to be repaid the $3.435 million advanced
to Zarin.421 One should not simply surmise that by settling on
$500,000, that was what Resorts had intended at the time the
credit was advanced.
Professor Alan Gunn indicated that “Zarin’s transactions
with the casino are best characterized as the purchase of the
opportunity to gamble for $500,000.”422 While Professor Gunn
agreed with the Tax Court that section 108(e)(5) was inapt because there was no purchase of property, he believed that there
is a non-statutory purchase price adjustment exception for services that “could easily have been extended to cover a situation
like Zarin’s.”423
Professor Richard C.E. Beck thought the Third Circuit
outcome was correct, but because “Zarin received neither money
nor goods nor services, and because he received no consideration
in exchange for his debt, he was left with nothing of value when the
debt was canceled, and he should not be taxed.”424 He believed that
since Resorts should never have extended Zarin credit, that “the
parties should be put back into the positions they were in before
Id.
See id.
422 Alan Gunn, Another Look at the Zarin Case, 50 TAX NOTES 893, 895 (1991).
423 Id. at 895. Professor Seto is in accord. He observed that
[a]t the trial court level, Zarin had not argued the nonstatutory
purchase price adjustment exception, and the court therefore had
no reason to address it. The nonstatutory exception, however,
is not limited to “property.” Consider, for example, the following scenario. A law firm sends Taxpayer a bill for $100,000 for
nondeductible services. Although the firm might win if it sued
for the $100,000 and although the client does not formally
dispute the bill, discussions lead the firm to reduce its charges to
$75,000 in what the real world would view as a purchase price adjustment. Under the nonstatutory exception, the partial discharge does not result in income to the client, even though the
services are clearly not “property.”
Seto, supra note 213, at 1785.
424 Richard C.E. Beck, Cancellation of Debt and Other Incidental Items of
Income: Puritan Tax Rules in the U.S., 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 695, 712 (2004/5)
[hereinafter Cancellation of Debt].
420
421
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the transactions were entered into. ... [I.e.,] the gambling losses
[should be] rescinded.”425 He equated Zarin to the contested liability decision N. Sobel, the case cited by the Third Circuit in Zarin,
but whose application to liquidated debt (whether or not enforceable) was refuted in Preslar.426 Under Professor Beck’s reasoning,
[i]f Sobel’s stock purchase had been for cash and the effect of
rescission were a return of Sobel’s cash, it would be obvious
that the reimbursement was simply a tax-free return of capital.
The same is true for Zarin. Zarin simply got his money back,
he gained nothing, and the casino lost nothing (except its
hoped-for gain).427

Professor Shaviro, who acknowledged that “Zarin is a
case without a right answer,”428 would have held for the taxpayer
“on the ground that there was no untaxed benefit because the
settlement cost presumably equaled the expected purchase price
given the ex-ante doubtfulness of repayment.”429 He too was very
Id. at 713.
See id. The Third Circuit reasoned that “[t]here is little difference between the present case [Zarin] and Sobel” and determined that “the transaction
between Zarin and Resorts can be best characterized as ... contested liability,”
thereby rejecting the Tax Court’s reasoning that contested liability was barred in
Zarin. Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 115–16 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that Sobel
“stands for the proposition that ‘there must be a liquidated debt’”) (citing
Colonial Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 855, 862–63 (1985)); see also N. Sobel,
Inc. v. Comm’r 40 B.T.A. 1263, 1265 (1939). The court in Preslar found that to
“implicate the contested liability doctrine the original amount of debt must be
unliquidated .... [not] the mere fact that the taxpayer challenges the enforceability of the debt.” Preslar v. Comm’r, 167 F.3d 1323, 1327–29 (10th Cir. 1999)
(citing Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 311–13 (1983); N. Sobel, 40 B.T.A. at
1263–65; Zarin, 916 F.2d at 115–16; Shaviro, supra note 11, at 256; Giangiordano,
supra note 86, at 1202 n.88l).
427 Cancellation of Debt, supra note 424, at 713. Zarin was still obviously
out his $500,000 settlement. See Zarin, 916 F.2d at 112.
428 Shaviro, supra note 11, at 250.
429 Id. at 258 (footnote omitted). Professor Shaviro also expressed the view
that ignoring the correct legal analysis, holding for Zarin would constitute
the equitable result. He mused that:
the belief that Zarin was too unfortunate to have $3 million of
taxable income makes the Tax Court’s decision intuitively distasteful even if one agrees with it. Pity for Zarin’s plight is only
one reason for the pro-taxpayer intuition, however. A second
reason is the side of the ledger on which the issue arose: the
425
426
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disparaging of the Third Circuit opinion.430 He stated that “[g]iven
the serious problems with the Third Circuit’s reasoning, one
fervently hopes that it will fail to live on as precedent for any
broad proposition of tax law.”431
Professor Joseph M. Dodge noted, near the beginning of
his article on Zarin, that “the stimulus for this article is a recent
piece by Professor Daniel Shaviro, which contains a penetrating
critique of the various options handed down in Zarin.”432 Very
helpfully, Professor Dodge agrees with the following items concerning Zarin (this writer is in accord with many, but not all, of
these positions433):
(1) The existence of debt-cancellation income is not dependent
upon a “freeing of assets” theory. (2) The parameters of such
income are determined neither by § 108 nor the § 61 regulations,
but rather by the evolving “common law” of gross income. (3) The
loan was a valid loan for tax purposes when made even if it was
then legally unenforceable. (4) Commissioner v. Tufts mandates
that the debt be treated, consistently with the foregoing, as being valid when cancelled (even if unenforceable). (5) The Third
Circuit majority’s statement that a compromise of a cash loan
does not give rise to debt-cancellation income is a serious blunder.
(6) Chips are not “property” under § 108(e)(5) (the statutory
purchase-price reduction rule). (7) A purchase-price reduction rule
exists independently of the statute, where the purchase-money
debt relates to consumption rather than an asset. (8) Bowers
v. Kerbaugh-Empire Corp., which allowed debt-cancellation
income to be excluded on the ground that such income was
fact that Zarin was being charged with additional gross income,
not denied the deduction of a loss.
Id. at 239. Professor Shaviro also, while not “ground[ing] the decision” because of it, “conclude[d] that compulsive or addicted gamblers should not be
taxed on cancellation of indebtedness income when they settle at a discount
gambling debts that were at least possibly unenforceable when entered into.”
Id. at 250.
430 Id. at 258.
431 Id.
432 Dodge, supra note 19, at 677 (footnote omitted).
433 As to item #8, this writer agrees if the word “is” was replaced by “should.”
See id. at 678. With respect to #7, this writer agrees that there certainly are
valid arguments that section 108(e)(5) does not preempt a court from applying a non-statutory purchase price reduction for services but as explained
infra does not subscribe to its application to Zarin. See id. at 677–78. He is in
accord with the rest of Professor Dodge’s assertions.
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less than the loss on the transaction funded by the borrowed
money, is no longer good law.434

Professor Dodge believed that Zarin should not have income
from the transaction, but for reasons that differ from that of the
Third Circuit.435 His central premise was that Zarin ‘received’
neither property nor cash, but only (if anything) consumption, which
appears in the tax base as $500,000, the amount spent on it.436
He considered it “plausible [but inaccurate] to say that the chips
were purchased with ‘borrowed money’ ....”437 Professor Dodge
concluded “that there can be no debt-cancellation income where
consumption is purchased on credit in commerce and the debt is
subsequently cancelled or settled.”438 Under Professor Dodge’s
rationale, “one cannot simply assume that Zarin received $3.4
million in money or money’s worth from the gambling transactions because $3.4 million was the face amount of the liability.”439
Professor Seto argued that the Tax Court’s conclusion
that “the actual value of Zarin’s chips equaled their face value—
$3,435,000 [was erroneous].”440 This was, he contended, because
New Jersey law required that the chips “first be applied against the
gambler’s outstanding credit balance.”441 This does not seem to
undercut that the chips face value equaled the $3.435 million debt
obligation. For example, if Zarin were to quit when he was ahead,
e.g., with $3.6 million worth of chips, the first $3.435 million would
go to the house to offset his debt and the remaining $165,000
worth of chips could be redeemed for their cash equivalent.
Another argument Professor Seto made that was consistent
with one advanced by Professor Dodge and others is that “[w]hen
purchase money debt is partially discharged, we must decide which
price—original or adjusted—should be deemed to represent the
value of the item for tax purposes.”442 That is, “[i]f ... the adjusted
Id. at 677–78 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 682.
436 Dodge, supra note 19, at 682.
437 Id. at 679.
438 Id. at 683 (footnote omitted).
439 Id. at 679.
440 Seto, supra note 213, at 1771.
441 Id.
442 Id. at 1773.
434
435
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price is the item’s deemed value, then the discharge merely brings
the price actually paid into line with the item’s deemed value.”443
Professor Seto’s article also provided “ways of thinking
about what happened: a theorist’s account,”444 including examining the case through the lens of the Haig-Simons definition of
income.445 Professor Seto furnished the foregoing assessment of
what he believed the right answer was with respect to Zarin:
A strong practical argument can be made that unenforceability should not determine whether discharged gambling debt is
taxable. A strong theoretical argument can be made that losing gamblers do not receive commensurate consumption value,
even if their debts are enforceable. It may also be true that
the Code does not treat gambling as a consumption activity.
And any tax rule governing the discharge of gambling debts
must work in both market and nonmarket contexts. For all of
these reasons, I suggest that the rule of United States v. Hall
is in fact “correct”—that the discharge of gambling debts
should be treated as nontaxable per se.446

Professor Zelenak would have decided in favor of the taxpayer,
although he, like several other commentators found “the opinion of
the Third Circuit majority [to be] technically indefensible ....”447
He subscribed to the view expressed by Judge Tannenwald that:
In all the decided cases involving the cancellation of indebtedness, the taxpayer had, in a prior year when the indebtedness
was created, received a nontaxable benefit clearly measurable
in monetary terms which would remain untaxed if the subsequent cancellation of the indebtedness were held to be tax
free. Such is simply not the case herein.448

Professor Zelenak, like some other scholars, rejected the notion that
Zarin should be viewed “as a case of gambling with borrowed
Id.
Id. at 1793 (the topic is discussed at 1793–1807).
445 See Seto, supra note 213, at 1795–99; HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL
INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938); ROBERT MURRAY HAIG, READINGS IN ECONOMICS
OF TAXATION 54 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 9th ed. 1959).
446 See Seto, supra note 213, at 1808.
447 See Zelenak, supra note 8, at 323.
448 Id. at 322 (footnote omitted) (citing Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1101
(1989) (Tannenwald, J., dissenting)).
443
444
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cash ....”449 Thus, if one agrees with Professor Zelenak, Zarin
would not be construed as a loan followed by the purchase of the
right to gamble and there would be no tax benefit when Zarin
received the gambling credit of $3.435 million.450 Therefore, under
the loan proceeds methodology there would be no COD income
upon settlement.451
Professor Barton, who would have found Zarin taxable,452
rejected the notion that the face value of the chips and loan were
less than $3.435 million.453 She pointed out that “[t]he fact that
Zarin spent $2.5 million of his own funds for chips of an equivalent $2.5 million face value corroborates the $3.435 million face
value of the chips and debt.”454 She disagreed with the notion
advanced by some other scholars that “the figure at the date of
settlement consumption is [on policy grounds] the appropriate
measure of the debt ....”455 Professor Barton considered that “the
otherwise unsupported assertion that the size of Zarin’s debt
equaled its $0.5 million settlement value appears to be a resultoriented pronouncement advanced on the basis of Zarin’s acknowledged compulsive condition.”456
Professor Barton was sympathetic to Zarin’s plight despite
her conclusion that he should have had COD income.457 She recognized that he was “[d]riven to gamble compulsively by a psychological aberration, [he] suffered dearly from loss of personal
fortune. The toll from his compulsive gambling would have been
grossly aggravated had the tax levy growing out of that very aberration been sustained.”458 Nevertheless, she believed it was not up to
the courts, but Congress to address these types of circumstances.459
Professors McMahon and Simmons also believed Zarin
should have been taxed.460 They wrote that “Zarin was erroneously
Id. at 324.
Id.
451 Id.
452 See Barton, supra note 168, at 782.
453 Id. at 763.
454 Id. at 763.
455 Id. at 764 (footnote omitted).
456 Id. at 765 (footnote omitted).
457 Id. at 781–82.
458 Id. at 781.
459 Id. at 782.
460 See McMahon & Simmons, supra note 3, at 437.
449
450
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decided and is unlikely to be generally followed.”461 They reasoned
that “[u]nder accepted principles that gross income includes the
objective, rather than subjective, value of items received in a
market transaction, the effect of the Third Circuit’s opinion was
to allow Zarin to receive $2.9 million tax-free, even though none
of the exceptions to section 61(a)(12) or section 108 applied.”462
Professor Schenk also thought that Zarin should have had
COD income.463 She pointed out that, as Judge Stapleton noted
in his dissent, “regardless of whether the loan was enforceable,
Zarin received something of value when he undertook the obligation which was not taxable.”464 She commented that “[i]f Zarin
had borrowed the $3.5 million from his local bank before arriving at the casino and then lost it all gambling, he clearly would
have had COD income if the bank discharged the debt.”465 The
funds were, as described by Professor Deborah A. Geier, “received
free of tax on the assumption that it would be repaid with after-tax
dollars. When that assumption proves unwarranted by $2,935,000,
the debtor’s accession to wealth is apparent.”466
Professor Schenk also posited that
[a]nother way to reach the same result [i.e., that Zarin should
be taxed] without delving into debt discharge theory is to tax
Zarin because he enjoyed consumption that he did not pay for and
was not a gift from the transferor. What Zarin purchased with
loan proceeds was entertainment (the right to gamble).467

Assuming an objective measure of enjoyment, i.e., spending, that
ignores the psychological state of a compulsive gambler, this too
Id.
Id.
463 See Schenk, supra note 12, at 169.
464 Id. (citing Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 118 (3d Cir. 1990) (Stapleton,
J., dissenting)). Professor Joel S. Newman was also in accord that Zarin
should have been taxed. Joel S. Newman, Five Will Get You Ten; You Haven’t
Heard the Last About ‘Zarin’, 50 TAX NOTES 667 n.7d (1991).
465 Schenk, supra note 12, at 169.
466 Deborah A. Geier, Tufts and the Evolution of Debt-Discharge Theory, 1
FLA. TAX REV. 115, 187 n.217. Her statement, however, was written under
the assumption that the money was borrowed from a third-party creditor and
not Resorts. See id. at 187.
467 Schenk, supra note 12, at 169 n.99.
461
462
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appears to be a reasonable means of further supporting the correct conclusion.468
While this writer does not concur with some of the Zarinrelated commentary, this does not detract from his admiration
for some very superb scholarship provoked by the case. Only a
relatively small part was touched upon by this Article. Despite
the conclusion reached here that Zarin should have had COD
income, the well-reasoned counter-arguments certainly elicit at
least some doubt.
D. Preslar v. Commissioner
The post-Zarin Tenth Circuit decision Preslar v. Commissioner merits discussion. There the court found the contested
liability doctrine inapplicable in a case with a liquidated debt
obligation.469 In Preslar, the husband and wife taxpayers purchased a 2,500 acre ranch in New Mexico.470 The consideration
was $1 million, which was financed with a promissory note by
Moncor Bank.471 The taxpayers’ plan was to subdivide the ranch
into cabin and vacation homes for hunters and others seeking
outdoor recreation.472 Moncor Bank allowed the taxpayers to
repay the indebtedness “by assigning the installment sales contracts of purchasers of cabin lots to [it] at a discount.”473 Subsequently, “Moncor Bank was declared insolvent and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed as receiver.”474 The FDIC “refused to accept further assignments of sale
contracts as repayment and ordered the Preslars to suspend
sales of cabin lots.”475 While the taxpayers stopped its sales, it
also ceased making further payments to the FDIC.476 They also
“filed an action against the FDIC for breach of contract ... seeking
468 Professor Dodge asserted that “the measure of consumption under the
income tax law is what was spent, not the value of what was acquired ... psychic
goods are not the measure of the tax base ....” Dodge, supra note 19, at 681
(footnotes omitted).
469 Preslar v. Comm’r, 167 F.3d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir. 1999).
470 Id.
471 Id.
472 Id.
473 Id.
474 Id.
475 Id. at 1325–26.
476 Id. at 1326.
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an order requiring the FDIC to accept assignment of sales contracts as loan repayment.”477 The litigation was eventually settled for payment of $350,000 (which the taxpayers borrowed
from another bank).478 The result, after taking prior payments
into consideration, was that slightly less than $450,000 was no
longer owed by the taxpayers to FDIC from the initial loan.479
After an audit, the Service assessed a deficiency on grounds that
the Preslars had discharge of indebtedness income of the approximate $450,000, which the FDIC agreed not to collect.480
The taxpayers argued in Tax Court that “their settlement
with the FDIC [was] a purchase price adjustment under § 108(e)(5)
and/or common law.”481 The Service asserted “that the Preslars
could not invoke § 108(e)(5) because that provision applies only
to situations where the seller of property agrees to reduce the
amount of the purchaser’s debt flowing from the property sale.”482
Furthermore, “[t]he party responsible for reducing the Preslars’
debt was not the seller but was the FDIC (as receiver for Moncor
Bank) thereby rendering § 108(e)(5) inapplicable.”483
The Tax Court ignored the question of the applicability of
section 108(e)(5) and “sua sponte invoked the contested liability
doctrine and held the Preslars’ unusual payment arrangement
with Moncor Bank caused their liability for the full $1 million
loan to be brought into question.”484 The Tax Court “determined
the true amount of the Preslars’ indebtedness was not firmly
established until they settled with the FDIC; thus, no dischargeof-indebtedness income could have accrued to the Preslars as a
result of the settlement.”485
The Tenth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and rejected
the appropriateness of applying the contested liability doctrine
to the case at bar.486 The Tenth Circuit examined both N. Sobel
and the Third Circuit decision in Zarin, where both courts found
Id.
Id.
479 Id.
480 Id.
481 Id.
482 Id.
483 Id.
484 Id.
485 Id.
486 Id. at 1328.
477
478
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the doctrine germane.487 The Tenth Circuit in Preslar was very
critical of the Third Circuit’s analysis in Zarin, commenting:
The problem with the Third Circuit’s holding [in Zarin] is it
treats liquidated and unliquidated debts alike. The whole theory
behind requiring that the amount of a debt be disputed before
the contested liability exception can be triggered is that only in
the context of disputed debts is the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) unaware of the exact consideration initially exchanged
in a transaction. ... The mere fact that a taxpayer challenges
the enforceability of a debt in good faith does not necessarily
mean he or she is shielded from discharge-of-indebtedness income upon resolution of the dispute. To implicate the contested
liability doctrine, the original amount of the debt must be
unliquidated. A total denial of liability is not a dispute touching upon the amount of the underlying debt. ... [Quoting a
commentator] “Enforceability of the debt ... should not affect
the tax treatment of the transaction. If the parties initially
treated the transaction as a loan when the loan proceeds were
received, thereby not declaring the receipt as income, then the
transaction should be treated consistently when the loan is
discharged and income should be declared in the amount of
the discharge.”488

Judge Ebel’s Preslar dissent pointed out that in N. Sobel,
When the note became due the corporation refused to pay,
disputing not the amount of the note but rather the validity of
the note itself “on the ground that the bank made the loan in
violation of law and failed to carry out promises to guarantee
the [corporation] against loss.”489

He further observed that “[t]he Board of Tax Appeals found no
discharge of indebtedness income, even though the corporation
did not dispute the amount of the debt and even though the original
amount was liquidated (at $21,700).”490 The dissent concluded
its argument that N. Sobel was not supportive of the majority’s
position with the following:
Id.
Id. at 1328–29. The last two sentences quoted by the Third Circuit is
from Giangiordano, supra note 86, at 1202 n.88.
489 Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1333–34 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
490 Id. at 1334 (citation omitted).
487
488
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[T]he majority’s view that the contested liability doctrine applies only when the original amount of a debt is disputed and
unliquidated is mistakenly narrow. This view ignores the fact
that the original amount of a debt is necessarily disputed and
may be unliquidated under a good faith dispute over liability
“that can be traced to the circumstances in existence at the
time of the debt’s creation.”491

The dissent’s position regarding N. Sobel was, at least,
somewhat doubtful. The Tenth Circuit majority indicated N.
Sobel applied the contested liability doctrine in a case where both
the liability and amount were in question.492 The court cited the
following language from the Board of Tax Appeals decision: “There
is question whether the taxpayer bought property in 1929 and
question as to its liability and the amount thereof.”493
Professor Musselman was among the scholars that were
critical of the utilization of the contested liability doctrine to avoid
COD income.494 He wrote that “Preslar provides a good example
of the confusion produced by the contested liability doctrine, and
why that doctrine, along with the freeing of assets theory,
should be fully and finally discarded.”495 Professor Musselman
argued that,
The contested liability doctrine is a necessary corollary to the
freeing of assets theory, to allow for a determination of the actual amount of the taxpayer’s liability in appropriate cases, so
that the amount of discharge (and thus the amount of income
from such discharge) can be determined. It is only because of
the unnecessary rigidity of the freeing of assets theory that
the contested liability doctrine has come into existence.496

Preslar was instructive that Tufts negates lack of enforceability as opening the door to the contested liability doctrine.497
The Tenth Circuit stated that the conclusion it reached that
“[t]he mere fact that a taxpayer challenges the enforceability of
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1328.
493 Id. at 1328 (citing N. Sobel, Inc. v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 1263, 1265 (1939)).
494 See Musselman, supra note 6, at 651.
495 Id.
496 Id. at 646–47 (footnotes omitted).
497 Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1329.
491
492
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a debt in good faith does not necessarily mean he or she is
shielded from discharge-of-indebtedness income upon resolution
of the dispute ... is underscored by the Supreme Court’s holding
in Tufts ....”498 The Tenth Circuit explained that in Tufts:
The Court reasoned that because the indebtedness is treated as
a true debt when it is incurred, it must be treated as a true debt
when it is discharged, with all the attendant tax consequences.
It seems evident from this ruling that if the distinction between the recourse and nonrecourse nature of a loan has no
bearing on calculation of gross income, the enforceability of a
debt should be of equally minimal importance.499

The Preslar dissent challenged the reliance on Tufts.500
Judge Ebel argued that “[n]onrecourse loans and unenforceable
debts are not functional equivalent. Nonrecourse loans are enforceable, unenforceable debts are not. A party may sue to collect on
a nonrecourse loan, but cannot sue to collect on an unenforceable
debt.”501 The dissent observed that
[w]hile a taxpayer has no personal liability upon default of a
nonrecourse loan, the taxpayer nonetheless is always liable
for the loan. That liability merely is capped by the value of the
underlying security interest .... Given an unenforceable debt,
the taxpayer has no liability. This distinction can make all
the difference for tax purposes.502

Lee Sheppard, writing prior to Preslar, had a contrary opinion to
that of the dissent as to the effect of Tufts,503 stating that “[i]f
the difference between recourse and nonrecourse does not matter for tax purposes, neither should legal enforceability.”504 Her
views were shared by other commentators.505
Id. at 1328–29.
Id. at 1329.
500 Id. at 1336 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
501 Id.
502 Id. at 1336–37.
503 Lee A. Sheppard, A Gambling Exception to Cancellation of Indebtedness
Income?, 49 TAX NOTES 1516, 1517 (1990).
504 Id.
505 See, e.g., Pomeroy, supra note 74, at 1690–91.
498
499
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Professor Chad J. Pomeroy506 made a forceful argument
that the Tenth Circuit legal analysis of Tufts applicability was
correct.507 He asserted that the Tenth Circuit was justified in
holding that if the debt was “liquidated (enforceable or not), the
Preslars would have to include any debt-discharge amount in
gross income.”508 He viewed Tufts as a game-changer in the resolution of whether a taxpayer has COD income.509 His contention
was that the Supreme Court in Tufts abandoned the freeing of
assets approach and adopted symmetry.510 As discussed above, the
Tax Court in Zarin cited Tufts and its concern with symmetry as
part of its reasoning in determining that lack of enforceability
should not prevent COD income from occurring.511 Professor
Pomeroy wrote that, in Tufts,
[t]he Supreme Court ... ignor[ed] whether the discharge freed the
taxpayer’s assets from obligations (or even the question of
whether the taxpayer had economic incentive to honor the obligation) and instead focus[ed] on whether an untaxed discharge
transaction would mean that “the mortgagor effectively will have
received untaxed income at the time the loan was extended.”512

He asserted that Tufts “was the birth of symmetry because
the Court cared only about the debt money that was received on
the front end of the transaction; that is, the amount that needs to
be taxed on the back end of the transaction (if, of course, it is discharged).”513 Symmetry is effectively another term for the loan
proceeds methodology. Professor Pomeroy stated that although
While currently a full professor at St. Mary’s University School of Law
he was a law student, albeit summa cum laude, when his Preslar comment
was published. Chad J. Pomeroy, ST. MARY’S SCH. OF L., https://law.stmarytx
.edu/academics/faculty/chad-pomeroy/ [https://perma.cc/MLA2-W732].
507 See, e.g., Pomeroy, supra note 74, at 1690–91.
508 See id. at 1699. However, it is important to note that Professor Pomeroy
believed that the Preslars’ debt was not liquidated. Id.
509 See id. at 1689.
510 See id. at 1689; see also Schenk, supra note 12, at 148 (referring to
United States v. Centennial Bank, the case where Professor Schenk observed
“that the Court essentially cites both the loan proceeds and the freeing-ofassets theories.”). But see United States v. Centennial Bank, 499 U.S. 573,
583 (1991) (decided after Tufts).
511 See Pomeroy, supra note 74, at 1689.
512 Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 310 (1983)).
513 Id.
506
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“the factual context of Tufts may have differed from the normal
debt-discharge income scenario, the Court’s reasoning was broad
enough to encompass all debt-discharge income.”514 Furthermore,
“[w]hen one gets rid of debt, the Court simply asks whether or
not the taxpayer is receiving an unwarranted accession to wealth
because the IRS did not tax the amount in the beginning since it
thought at the time that the taxpayer was obligated to repay the
debt.”515 He noted that if one applies this methodology, the Service should “not care if the debt is enforceable because that does
not affect the amount initially received and excluded.”516
Prior to the decision in Preslar, Professor Barton also emphasized the importance of Tufts, as to how Zarin should have
been analyzed by the Third Circuit.517 She stated that:
If Zarin in fact derived an unpaid-for benefit in settling the
$3.5 million loan for a payment of $0.5 million, the Tufts doctrine requires that he report income equal to the value of the
benefit, whether or not the loan was enforceable or incurred for
the purpose of gambling. It was this issue of benefit, not enforceability, that deserved the Third Circuit’s attention in Zarin.518

One other item worth mentioning in Preslar, with relevance
to Zarin, was the discussion of the taxpayers’ argument that:
[T]he common law purchase price reduction doctrine may be
invoked in cases where ... § 108(e)(5) is inapplicable. The Commissioner responds that § 108(e)(5) has displaced the common
law on this issue and, in any event, a debt reduction by a thirdparty lender was not considered a purchase price adjustment
under common law.519

The Tenth Circuit suggested that section 108(e)(5) may be
interpreted as preempting the common law with respect to purchase
money debt disputes, observing that “[i]f, as the Preslars argue, the
common law rule remains viable and permits taxpayers involved in
third-party transactions to treat their debt reductions as purchase price adjustments rather than additions to their gross
Id. at 1690 (footnote omitted).
Id.
516 Id. at 1692.
517 See Barton, supra note 168, at 757.
518 Id.
519 Preslar v. Comm’r, 167 F.3d 1323, 1332 (10th Cir. 1999).
514
515
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income, § 108(e)(5) would be rendered meaningless.”520 However,
many scholars believe there remains a common law purchase price
exclusion outside of section 108(e)(5). Professors McMahon and
Simmons indicated that the Tenth Circuit comment on preemption
was “erroneous.”521 Professor Dodge noted that “[a] purchase-price
reduction rule exists independently of the statute, where the
purchase-money debt relates to consumption rather than an
asset.”522 Professor Gunn expressed sentiments similar to that of
Professor Dodge.523
E. Analysis
While there is a temptation to simply state, as Professor
Shaviro did that “Zarin is a case without a right answer,”524 this
Article proffers a resolution, but with the recognition that there
are reasonable contrary positions.525 Furthermore, as discussed
in the final hypothetical below, this writer would not extend
Zarin to other service providers who were not also functioning
as de facto lenders.526
This writer is of the opinion that the Tax Court and Judge
Stapleton were correct in concluding that Zarin should have had
COD income and that the loan proceeds approach is the appropriate methodology for making this determination.527 While Professor Pomeroy may or may not be right that the Supreme Court
in Tufts abandoned the freeing of assets approach,528 and Professor Schenk was unconvinced,529 the utilization of the loan
proceeds theory was certainly consistent with Tufts’s requirement
Id.
McMahon & Simmons, supra note 3, at 436.
522 Dodge, supra note 19, at 678.
523 See Gunn, supra note 422, at 895.
524 Shaviro, supra note 11, at 250.
525 See discussion infra Section II.E.
526 See id.
527 See id.; see also Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 118 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990)
(Stapleton, J., dissenting).
528 See Pomeroy, supra note 74, at 1689.
529 See Schenk, supra note 12, at 148. But see id. at 151 (stating that “[l]egislative history indicates that when Congress revamped the insolvency rules as
part of the Bankruptcy Act of 1980, it abandoned the freeing-of-assets theory
in favor of the loan proceeds approach”).
520
521
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for symmetry.530 This methodology rests on the proposition, articulated by Professors Bittker and Thompson, that “[d]ebtors who
ultimately pay back less than they received enjoy a financial benefit
whether the funds are invested successfully, lost in a business
venture, spent for food and clothing, or given to a charity.”531 One
should add “lost in gambling” to that list. Moreover, as discussed
infra, none of the possible exceptions should change the result that
Zarin should have had taxable income from the settlement.532
Contrary to Judge Tannenwald’s dissenting Tax Court opinion in Zarin,533 and the view of some scholars, including Professor
Zelenak,534 the debt obligation and the amount received was
measurable, $3.435 million, at the time of the loans’ creation.535
Prior to placing his first bet, Zarin could have, if he so desired,
used the gambling credit he received to extinguish his debt to
Resorts, dollar for dollar.536 Similar treatment would have occurred
if he settled when he was ahead or even behind, but not wiped
out. If he had, for example, decided to quit when he was down,
for example $435,000, he could have extinguished $3 million of
debt with his remaining credit.
Zarin was not subject to tax when he received the chips
because both parties had an understanding it would be repaid.537
This tax benefit he received at the time of the loans results in COD
income, unless an exception applied, and none should. As described by Professors Bittker and Thompson, the “borrowed funds
are excluded from gross income when received because of the assumption that they will be repaid in full and that a tax adjustment
is required when this assumption proves erroneous.”538 This conclusion should not be undermined simply because Zarin obtained
for his indebtedness gambling credit instead of cash. Even though
he was out $500,000, he had a $2.935 million accession to wealth
See Geier, supra note 466, at 145.
Bittker & Thompson, supra note 49, at 1165.
532 See discussion infra Section II.E.
533 See Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1101 (1989) (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
534 See Zelenak, supra note 8, at 323.
535 See, e.g., Zorn, supra note 418, at 33 & n.182; see also Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1088.
536 See Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1087–88.
537 See supra notes 98–105 and accompanying text.
538 Bittker & Thompson, supra note 49, at 1165 (footnote omitted).
530
531
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under the tax laws.539 The fact that someone unfamiliar with
federal taxation would likely find this result odd should not
cause the law to be ignored.
As a hypothetical, assume a later day Zarin in 2020, were
to borrow $3.435 million from a bank he intended to fund his
gambling, and he placed real estate as collateral for the loan.
Further suppose the following events occurred. The value of the
real estate diminished substantially to $500,000. Zarin put the
money he received from the bank under his mattress. His bedroom caught fire, destroying the cash before he set foot in the
casino. He lacks insurance for his loss. He settled with the bank
for the real estate now worth $500,000. Because of section
165(h)(5)’s limitation on casualty losses from 2018 to 2025, he
does not obtain a tax deduction for his loss.540 While perhaps our
hypothetical Zarin is as sympathetic as the real one, it should be
fairly clear that he has COD income of $2.935 million.541
There is an argument that the foregoing analysis misapplies
the correct interpretation of the loan proceeds methodology. The
reasoning essentially is that Zarin did not actually obtain $3.435
million in U.S. dollars from Resorts, and since “the debtor did not
originally receive cash or other loan proceeds in exchange for incurring the debt, its cancellation should not be taxable.”542 That is,
according to Professor Zelenak, “Zarin should be understood as a
case of gambling with borrowed cash ....”543 It should be seen instead
“as nothing more than a reduction of the cost of the gambling
experience.”544 While this analysis is not entirely unreasonable, this
way of thinking arguably opens up a Pandora’s box as to where
the line is drawn.545 For example, what if instead, Resorts owned
Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1085; supra note 409 and accompanying text.
See I.R.C. § 165(h)(5).
541 The fact he did not “consume” the loan proceeds should not change this
result; nor should the fact, like gambling losses, he received no tax benefit for
his loss.
542 Beck, supra note 99, at 166.
543 Zelenak, supra note 8, at 324. Zelenak goes on to explain that he believes Zarin would be better characterized as “merely a case of gambling without
an escrow,” meaning no COD income arises. Id.
544 Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 206.
545 See discussion infra Section II.E. As will be discussed at the end of this
section, this writer’s distinction of Zarin from some other service providers
539
540
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a bank that lent him the money to buy the chips utilized in the
casino? Assuming one would agree he would have COD income in
that scenario, should the answer in Zarin be different “on the
happenstance that the creditor wore two hats: lender as well as
vendor of the services purchased with the credit”?546
If one, erroneously in the opinion of this writer, were to
utilize the historic whole transaction approach, encompassing
the Kerbaugh-Empire methodology, instead of the loan proceeds
approach, then Zarin’s gambling losses would have precluded
his being taxed because these losses would nullify an increase in
net worth.547 This methodology is incorrect and should not be
followed. Professor Dodge was of the view that, “Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Corp., which allowed debt-cancellation income to
be excluded on the ground that such income was less than the
loss on the transaction funded by the borrowed money, is no
longer good law.”548 Regardless of whether Professor Dodge was
correct, it should “no longer [be considered] good law.”549 The
transactional approach espoused by Professors Kahn and Kahn
would similarly, but for different reasons, find no COD income;
it would be treated “as nothing more than a reduction of the cost
of the gambling experience.”550
What about the application of the freeing of assets methodology to Zarin? To employ this approach would be mistaken,
for reasons articulated by Professors Bittker and Thompson:
“Such reasoning misses the point. Income results from the discharge of indebtedness because the taxpayer received (and excluded from income) funds that he is no longer required to pay
back, not because assets are freed of offsetting liabilities on the
balance sheet.”551 Commentators disagree as to the result if it
had been applied to the Zarin fact-pattern.552 One view is that
COD income would occur, because “any cancellation leads to an
who reduce or eliminate fees to customers perhaps opens up another Pandora’s
box on where the line is drawn.
546 Geier, supra note 466, at 188 n.217.
547 See discussion supra Part I.
548 Dodge, supra note 19, at 678 (footnotes omitted).
549 Id.
550 Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 206.
551 Bittker & Thompson, supra note 49, at 1165.
552 Compare Newman, supra note 464, at 667 n.7a, with Pomeroy, supra
note 74, at 1693–94.
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increase in net worth, whether the loan proceeds were used for
consumption [as in Zarin] or investment.”553
Professor Pomeroy, in contrast, argued the freeing of assets
theory was in fact implicitly utilized by the Third Circuit in Zarin in
determining the absence of COD income.554 He asserted that “[t]he
court [in effect implicitly utilized the freeing of assets methodology
when it] allowed the after-the-fact debt valuation because it focused
on the concept of asset worth—it wanted to know how much, in
Zarin’s current assets, the debt really represented at the time of
purchase.”555 He contended that the “Third Circuit [in Zarin]
searched for an answer to that question: how much was the original debt really worth? Since acknowledging that the more one has
lost the more one has consumed seems odd and counterintuitive; the
court refused to stop at the standard cost-based approach.”556 It
essentially “allowed the parties to assign a value after they had
concluded that the debt was legally unenforceable.”557 He believed
that the Third Circuit “implicitly adopted a freed assets justification but did not want to explicitly say so, in light of the fact that
Tufts had probably overruled that justification.”558
The right conclusion that the Third Circuit should have
reached was that Zarin had COD income not altered by any of the
following: 1) the fact the debt was found to be unenforceable by the
Tax Court; 2) the contested liability doctrine; 3) section 108(d)(1); 4)
section 108(e)(5); or 5) a common law version of the purchasemoney debt reduction for services.559 The fact that the Tax Court
found the debt to be legally unenforceable (under circumstances
Newman, supra note 464, at 667 n.7a.
See Pomeroy, supra note 74, at 1693–94.
555 Id.
556 Id. at 1694.
557 Id.
558 Id. at 1695 (footnote omitted). Professor Pomeroy noted that the freed assets
approach is more sensitive to what the initial consumption
was really worth (i.e., a person would not encumber his assets
unless he had some set value in mind), the court is more willing to allow parties to go back and re-decide how much things
were worth if the transaction seems odd to the court. Also, the
fact that Zarin only cited freed assets cases suggests that this
is indeed the rationale the court was implicitly adopting.
Id. at 1695 n.109.
559 See discussion supra Sections II.A, II.B.
553
554
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where the Service bore the burden of proof) should not have prevented COD income from occurring upon the debt’s settlement.560
The Tax Court correctly determined that “[t]he enforceability of
petitioner’s debts under New Jersey law did not affect either the
timing or amount and thus is not determinative for federal income tax purposes.”561
Instead of focusing on whether the debt was enforceable,
as the Third Circuit did, it should have concentrated upon what
the parties intended at the time the debtor-creditor relationship
commenced. The parties clearly desired to establish loans by
Resorts to Zarin of $3.435 million to engage in gambling at its
casino.562 Even many commentators who believed the outcome of
the Third Circuit decision was correct, agreed that the Third
Circuit’s concentration on the loans’ unenforceability was an
improper red herring.563 Professor Dodge, citing James v. United
States, concluded that “[t]he [Resorts’] loan was a valid loan for
tax purposes when made even if it was then legally unenforceable.”564 Professor Shaviro wrote that:
[l]egal enforceability should not be deemed a prerequisite to
includability in gross income. It shifts the focus from economic substance, or whether the parties expect repayment, to a
legal technicality that provides only one possible ground for
the expectation. An expectation of repayment can also arise
from personal trust founded on a mutual sense of moral obligation, or from the debtor’s self-interest if she has a business
reputation to protect or there is an ongoing, mutually profitable course of dealing between the parties.565

As noted, the Third Circuit’s focus on enforceability was
properly criticized by the Tenth Circuit in Preslar, where the court
stated that the
Pomeroy, supra note 74, at 1694.
Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1094 (1989).
562 See id. at 1105.
563 See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 19.
564 Dodge, supra note 19, at 678. Professor Dodge wrote that James “is
squarely on point for this proposition. There, the Court stated the test in terms
of a ‘consensual recognition ... of an obligation to repay.’” Id. at 678 n.4 (citing
James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 219 (1961).
565 See Shaviro, supra note 11, at 254 n.122.
560
561

612 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:537
[e]nforceability of the debt ... should not affect the tax treatment
of the transaction. If the parties initially treated the transaction
as a loan when the loan proceeds were received, thereby not
declaring the receipt as income, then the transaction should
be treated consistently when the loan is discharged and income should be declared in the amount of the discharge.566

As was recognized in Preslar, this conclusion is clearly supported
by the Court’s decision in Tufts.567
The Third Circuit in Zarin applied the contested liability
doctrine because it stated that “when a debt is unenforceable, it
follows that the amount of the debt, and not just the liability
thereon, is in dispute.”568 This was simply wrong as Preslar indicated.569 There, the Tenth Circuit stated, “[t]o implicate the contested liability doctrine, the original amount of the debt must be
unliquidated. A total denial of liability is not a dispute touching
upon the amount of the underlying debt.”570 The debt in Zarin
was liquidated.571 There was no disagreement that the amount
of the loans was originally set at $3.435 million.572 The Tax
Court’s assessment of the invalidity of the contested liability
doctrine to Zarin was, in contrast to the Third Circuit, spot on.
The Tax Court opinion stated:
There is no dispute about the amount petitioner received. The
parties dispute only its legal enforceability, i.e., whether petitioner could be legally compelled to pay Resorts the fixed amount
he had borrowed. A genuine dispute does not exist merely because petitioner required Resorts to sue him before making
payment of any amount on the debt.573

The Third Circuit’s rationale for applying the contested liability doctrine would expand it considerably beyond its purpose
to cover situations wherein “the debtor disputes liability for the
Preslar v. Comm’r, 167 F.3d 1323, 1329 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Giangiordano, supra note 86, at 1202 n.88).
567 Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 312 (1983).
568 Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 116 (3d Cir. 1990).
569 Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1328 (footnote omitted).
570 Id.
571 Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1094 (1989).
572 Id. at 1088.
573 Id. at 1095–96.
566
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amount claimed by the alleged creditor, because such a debt is
neither ‘absolute and not contingent’ nor for ‘a fixed amount.’”574
As noted by one commentator, if the Third Circuit’s reasoning to
treat all unenforceable debts as subject to the contested liability
doctrine, then “income from the discharge of indebtedness will
never result when the underlying debt is unenforceable.”575 Limiting the contested liability doctrine to liquidated debt obligations is sound tax policy. It’s a non-statutory exception to COD
income where Congress has created specific exclusions.576 Finally,
the consequence of the Third Circuit’s position, which is that
there is no COD income on the forgiveness of unenforceable
debts, is that the proceeds that are received initially without any
offsetting legal obligation to pay back should result in income in
the initial year under section 61.577
Section 108(d)(1) also does not change the result that Zarin
should have had taxable income. The Third Circuit was right
about section 108(d)(1) not applying, but for the wrong reason.
As discussed above, section 108(d)(1) defines “indebtedness of
the taxpayer” to mean “[f]or purposes of this section ... (A) for
which the taxpayer is liable, or (B) subject to which the taxpayer
holds property.”578 The Third Circuit found that neither (A) nor
(B) was satisfied.579 There should be little controversy that “Zarin
did not hold property” when the debt was discharged because
even if it were incorrectly treated to be property for purposes of
this section,580 the chips were gone by the time the dispute was
settled.581 The Third Circuit’s finding that “[b]ecause the debt
Zarin owed to Resorts was unenforceable as a matter of New
Jersey state law, it is clearly not a debt ‘for which the taxpayer
is liable,’”582 was, however, in error. Lack of enforceability does
not abrogate a taxpayer’s liability. As discussed, this point should
be academic. This is because, as Judge Stapleton stated in a
Bittker & Thompson, supra note 49, at 1169 (footnote omitted).
Giangiordano, supra note 86, at 1200.
576 I.R.C. § 108(a)(1).
577 See Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1088.
578 I.R.C. § 108(d)(1) (emphasis added).
579 Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 113–14 (3d Cir. 1990).
580 The Third Circuit correctly found it not to be “property” for this purpose.
See id. at 114.
581 Id.
582 Id. at 113.
574
575
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footnote, “[s]ection 108(d) expressly defines that term solely for
the purposes of § 108 and not for the purposes of § 61(a)(12).”583
As discussed above, some, but not all the commentators found,
as this writer does, this to be a compelling argument.584
Both the Tax Court and the Third Circuit determined section
108(e)(5) to be inapposite to Zarin, albeit for different reasons.585
The statutory provision should certainly have been inapplicable,
because both the gambling chips were not as the Tax Court indicated the “normal commercial property”586 intended to be covered by the provision and also that the section cannot operate in
circumstances like Zarin where the taxpayer does not own the
property at time of the settlement.587 One requirement for satisfying the “purchase-money debt reduction for solvent debtors,”
i.e., section 108(e)(5), which treats such transactions as price
reductions rather than COD income, is that “the debt of a purchaser of property to the seller of such property ... arose out of
the purchase of such property ....”588 The Tax Court determined
that Zarin incurred the indebtedness for “[t]he ‘opportunity to
gamble,’” and that he did not buy “property” as that term is used
in section 108(e)(5).589 Professor Seto pointed out that a major
flaw in Judge Ruwe’s Tax Court dissent was that he “treated the
‘purchase’ of the chips as an event having independent tax significance.”590 As was recognized by both the Tax Court and the Third
Circuit, “the chips [were] nothing more than ‘the opportunity to
gamble ...[;]’ [they] are merely an accounting mechanism to evidence debt.”591 In this regard, Professor Shaviro wrote:
Within the casino, the chips were a form of cash. They evidenced
money that had been paid in or credit that had been granted,
and they represented specific dollar values that could not
fluctuate. The price of a chip, like the price of a five dollar bill
and unlike the price of a car, was not negotiable. Thus, the dispute
Id. at 118 n.3 (Stapleton, J., dissenting).
Supra Section II.B.
585 Supra Section II.C.
586 Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1099 (1989).
587 Id. at 1099–100.
588 I.R.C. § 108(e)(5).
589 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1099.
590 See Seto, supra note 213, at 1789.
591 Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Zarin, 92 T.C.
at 1099).
583
584
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between Zarin and Resorts could not possibly have been a purchase price adjustment ....592

Furthermore, as Judge Stapleton noted in his Third Circuit dissenting opinion, section 108(e)(5) “necessarily applies
only to a situation in which the debtor still holds the property
acquired in the purchase money transaction.”593 As was explained
by Professor Seto, section 108(e)(5) simply does not work in situations like Zarin where assuming arguendo chips constituted
“normal commercial property;”594 he didn’t hold them at the time
of settlement and thus there was no basis in property that could
be adjusted.595 He explained why the debtor’s holding the property at time of settlement is critical for the statute to work
properly.596 He indicated that the
deferral mechanism [in section 108(e)(5) or its no-statutory
counterpart] cannot operate unless the taxpayer still owns the
property. If the taxpayer has already disposed of the property
and has accounted for that disposition using the original
higher basis, application of either purchase price adjustment
exception will mismeasure the taxpayer’s income ....597

See Shaviro, supra note 11, at 248. Professor Shaviro, however, recognized that
[o]ne could draw the § 108(e)(5) line either way .... [but i]f one
wants to decide the case in Zarin’s favor, however, one may
prefer to rely on the cancellation of indebtedness issue, because
there the focus is directly on expected cost, rather than on the
technical issue of what ‘property’ means for § 108(e)(5) purposes.
Id. at 249 (footnote omitted).
593 Zarin, 916 F.2d at 118 n.3 (Stapleton, J., dissenting).
594 Id.
595 See Seto, supra note 213, at 1789.
596 Id.
597 Id. Professor Seto reasoned that:
In Zarin’s case, for example, Ruwe would apparently have allowed
Zarin the $3.435 million in 1980 gambling losses—subject, of
course, to the limitations of § 165(d)—because at the time Zarin
lost the chips they had a basis equal to their original purchase
price. Applying the statutory purchase price adjustment exception
to exclude any debt discharge income, he would therefore ultimately have credited Zarin with $3.435 million of net losses
even though Zarin was in fact out of pocket only $500,000. In
other words, Ruwe would have mismeasured Zarin’s income.
592
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The Third Circuit did not discuss section 108(e)(5) per se,
but evidently found section 108 in its entirety inapplicable because it determined that there “was no indebtedness of the taxpayer” within the meaning of section 108(d)(1).598 As noted
above, the conclusion vis-a-vis section 108(d)(1) was in error.599
In sum, the right decision with respect to section 108(e)(5) was
reached, but for the wrong reason.
While the Tenth Circuit, in Preslar, suggested that the enactment of section 108(e)(5) preempted a non-statutory purchasemoney debt reduction,600 absent clear language that Congress
intended to displace this common law approach, the arguments
of many commentators, including Professors Dodge and Gunn
are persuasive that a court could have employed this approach
for services in Zarin.601 Professor Dodge wrote that “[a] purchase-price reduction rule exists independently of the statute,
Id. at 1789–90. Another commentator, Douglas E. Kulper, also explained why
section 108(e)(5) relief should not apply when the taxpayer is devoid of the
property at settlement. See Kulper, supra note 345, at 642. He wrote that:
[P]urchase-money debt reduction occurs when a purchaser of
property agrees to incur a debt to the seller, but the seller
subsequently reduces the debt because the value of the property is less than the agreed consideration. Even assuming that
the property requirement of section 108(e)(5) was met, a purchase
price adjustment could not occur under the facts in Zarin. The
purchase-money debt reduction involves three steps. First,
the chips purchased are assigned a tax basis equivalent to the
loan. In Zarin’s case, this would be $3,450,000 this should be
$3,435,000. Second, the basis in the chips is reduced by the
amount of purchase price adjustment, in this case $2,935,000.
This would occur at settlement. Third, the buyer recognizes
income from the purchase price adjustment when the property is sold or transferred. At that time, the amount received
above the basis in the property becomes recognized income. In
Zarin’s case, however, the basis in the property was zero at
the time of the settlement. He extinguished the basis by using
the chips for his gambling enjoyment. Because Zarin’s basis in
the chips at the time of settlement was zero and Zarin no longer
retained the power of transferability of the chips, a purchase
price adjustment could not occur.
Id. at 639–40.
598 See Zarin, 916 F.2d at 113.
599 See supra Section II.E.
600 Preslar v. Comm’r, 167 F.3d 1323, 1332–33 (10th Cir. 1999).
601 See Gunn, supra note 422, at 895; Dodge, supra note 19, at 678.
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where the purchase-money debt relates to consumption rather
than an asset.”602 If this writer correctly understood Professor
Dodge, it was his opinion that the reasoning of the court should
have been that the cost of the gambling services ought to have
been adjusted downward to the $500,000 payment, since “there
can be no debt-cancellation income where the consumption is
purchased on credit in commerce and the debt is subsequently
cancelled or settled.”603
Would this have been an appropriate analysis and outcome for Zarin? Professor Schenk’s opinion was that it would not
have been suitable. She stated:
Whether the chips were property under § 108(e)(5) is a red
herring. The real issue is whether the exception should apply
when the debtor has received and used or consumed property
worth the face amount of the debt when received .... [A] purchase price adjustment is inappropriate where it is the credit
worthiness of the borrower that has changed and the borrower
has fully enjoyed the entertainment or services. Other than
the majority opinion in the Third Circuit, no one argued that
Zarin did not enjoy $3.5 million of gambling. Certainly Resorts did not claim that one could pay less than $3.5 million.
If I turned up at Resorts tomorrow and asked for $3.5 million
in chips, chances are I would have to cough up $3.5 million.604

Zarin was not a circumstance where the taxpayer did not
obtain the services he paid for.605 He obviously received the
gambling services he incurred the debt for.606 There was certainly no understanding by the parties that he would be successful
at it.607 Despite the foregoing, one should not be blindsided to
what could be viewed as an inequity. Zarin was an unfortunate
gambler, suffering from an addiction that was likely exploited by
Resorts, and put in a position of owing the federal government
millions of dollars on the settlement of his losses.608 While sharing the empathy of many writers for Zarin, this does not mean
Dodge, supra note 19, at 678 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 683.
604 Schenk, supra note 12, at 166, 166 n.88.
605 Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1099 (1989).
606 See id.
607 See id.
608 See id. at 1086.
602
603
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the federal tax law should be construed in such a manner as to
carve out an exception for him, which is not consistent with the
law with respect to COD income. To remedy what many might
view as an injustice with respect to future Zarins (assuming the
Third Circuit opinion is not followed), Congress could, as Professor Barton suggested,609 amend the Code. In addition to or in
lieu of carving out a special exception in section 108, this might
include modifying section 165(d) to allow COD income from settling a gambling related indebtedness to be offset by current or a
prior year’s (or possibly years’) gambling losses.
Finally, a reviewer of an earlier draft of this Article posed
a hypothetical along the following lines as to how far this writer
would extend his reasoning with respect to Zarin. A homeowner
loses his job during the COVID-19 pandemic and his local utility
company agrees to reduce the customer’s electric bill by $200
from $300 to $100. Does the customer have $200 of COD income? There is a line of reasoning that he does. That is why not
treat utility services and gambling services alike? There is, however, a contrary rationale. As discussed, this writer believes that
Resorts should be treated as functioning as both a lender, making substantial loans, and a provider of gambling services.610
The settlement had the effect of reducing Zarin’s indebtedness to
his financier, Resorts.611 This is why he should be taxed. The
utility on the other hand is providing a service that it bills customers for after it is furnished, and it merely reduced the cost of
this service. This is arguably not the equivalent of the two hats
worn by Resorts in Zarin. There is a legitimate position not to
treat all service suppliers billing their fees after its provision as
being characterized as lenders, with the reduction or cancellation of the payable treated as COD income. In most of those circumstances, there is merit in Professor Dodge’s assertion that
there should be “no debt-cancellation income where consumption
is purchased on credit in commerce and the debt is subsequently
cancelled or settled.”612 This writer would thus not extend his
See Barton, supra note 168, at 782.
See supra notes 555–62 and accompanying text.
611 See Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1088 (1989); Bittker & Thompson,
supra note 49, at 1165.
612 See Dodge, supra note 19, at 683.
609
610
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conclusion in Zarin to encompass all situations where a taxpayer’s
obligation to a service provider is reduced or eliminated.613
CONCLUSION
While there are plausible arguments to the contrary,
Zarin should have had been determined to have COD income
from his settlement with Resorts.614 Zarin was not subject to tax
when he received the gambling credit because both parties had,
at the time the indebtedness was incurred, an understanding
that it would be repaid.615 This tax benefit he received at the
time of the loans results in COD income upon the indebtedness’
settlement for less than what was owed, unless an exception
applied, and none should have in this case.616
The loan proceeds methodology, or a variation thereof, is
the proper means of establishing whether a taxpayer has COD
income, prior to considering whether any of the exceptions apply.617 Both the freeing of assets and the Kerbaugh-Empire form
of the whole transaction concepts should no longer be followed
by the courts.618

But see Musselman, supra note 6, at 634–35. Although he would not
have taxed Zarin on all or at least part of the reduction to his liability, based
on his tax accountant preparation hypothetical discussed above, he would
likely treat the $200 as COD income.
614 See supra Section II.E; supra text accompanying note 569.
615 See supra notes 98–105 and accompanying text.
616 See supra notes 98–105 and accompanying text; see also McMahon &
Simmons, supra note 3, at 437 (“[N]one of the exceptions to section 61(a)(12)
or section 108 applied.”).
617 See supra Section II.E.
618 See Schenk, supra note 12, at 144 (discussing criticism of freeing of assets); see also Bittker & Thompson, supra note 49, at 1162–63 (discussing
whole transaction theory and why it is defective).
613

